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Articles on

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and
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School of Journalism
MONTANA STATE UNIVERSITY
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In Memoriam

Olaf J. Bue

1901 - 1962

The Montana School of Journalism and journalism education lost one of its most popular and respected teachers on March 7, 1962, with the death at home of Olaf J. Bue, 60, after a long illness.

Mr. Bue began teaching at MSU in 1943 and was acting dean from 1954 to 1956.

Although Mr. Bue taught reporting, photography and other news and editorial courses, he also was widely known for his activity in education for radio journalism. He founded "Static," bulletin of the Council on Radio-Television Journalism, and was chairman of the Council for the 1959 convention of the Association for Education in Journalism. He also edited the Summer, 1957, issue of Journalism Quarterly, a special issue devoted to "Trends in the Field of Electronic Journalism."

He gave years of service to the Western Montana Press Radio Club, of which he was president in 1949, and to the annual shepherding of several hundred MSU seniors through their colorful graduation program as chairman of the Commencement Committee.

Mr. Bue was born in Rollo, N.D., in 1901, was graduated from the MSU School of Journalism in 1923 and received his master's degree from Northwestern in 1941. He liked to reminisce with colleagues at conventions on the years they worked together on the Chicago Daily News and the Chicago Tribune and when with nine other professors he covered the 1952 political conventions for NBC-TV.

Before returning to MSU in 1943 as an associate professor, he also worked on the Kalispell News and the Red Lodge Picket Journal, taught at Ohio University, and was director of information for the Office of Censorship at San Antonio, Tex.

He was equally at home with high school students and teachers. To the semi-annual meetings of MIEA he brought counsel based on five years at Flathead County High School in Kalispell, and his comments as judge of high school newspapers and yearbooks were written in rich and occasionally deflating prose. He had a similar capacity to appraise the products of J-School reporters, copy-readers and photographers.

Fund for Bue Reporting Award Established

An Olaf J. Bue memorial award for outstanding reporting by an undergraduate journalism student at Montana State University has been established. This is what we think Ole would have liked. Tributes may be sent to the School of Journalism, Missoula, Montana.

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No. 5 Spring, 1962

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Dean A. L. Stone Address

THE PRESS, ATLANTIC UNION and WORLD PEACE

By *CLARENCE K. STREIT*

Nominated four times for the Nobel Peace Prize, CLARENCE K. STREIT *is founder of the Atlantic Union movement and editor of* Freedom & Union *magazine. He is a 1919 graduate of the Montana State University School of Journalism and a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University. In 1925, after several years as a foreign correspondent, he joined the* New York Times *and was with that newspaper for ten years. His most famous book,* Union Now, *was published in 1939. His latest book is* Freedom's Frontier—Atlantic Union Now.

The Problem

Everyone, it seems, favors freedom of the press—yet everyone wants to control the press. Even the editors and reporters do.

As an old reporter and foreign correspondent I want to testify that not only sound instinct but hard experience has prompted newspapermen to insist on free and equal dissemination of news throughout the world as an essential to peace.

Of course, as every reporter and editor knows, when you print the facts freely you very frequently make someone "fighting mad;" you can get anything but peace by printing the news freely. I have gotten into trouble more than once that way myself—ranging from the time the Rumanian government expelled me in 1927 because of my dispatches to the *New York Times,* all the way back to the time when, as editor of the Missoula County High School paper, *The Konah,* I printed an editorial denouncing the sophomore class for having gone on a sleigh ride the night when I thought they should have been out rooting for the basketball team.

The widespread desire to get opinion and news freely printed is pretty much like the widespread desire for an international police. Everyone wants to get the other fellow policed, and everyone wants to read all the lowdown about him, too—but a good many lose their enthusiasm when it comes to being policed themselves, or having the lowdown printed about themselves, or opinions contrary to their own.

Nonetheless, I am convinced that free news is essential to peace. Indeed, I would go further; I would say unhesitatingly that I value freedom of the press even more than peace, and you know how highly I value peace.

One of my major purposes in writing *Union Now* was to advance the freedom of the press. I would sacrifice peace to secure the freedom of the press—and free, above all, from government control. I know of no surer guarantee of peace than to have the press free in every civilized country. But I also know, as does every experienced newspaperman, that we are very far from that goal now.

First, let us face the fact that in most countries the press

is not and never has been long free from government control, direct or indirect. This control results primarily from the tremendous importance of the press to those in power. As a rule, the more a country is exposed to danger, the more important the press becomes to the government and the more liable the government is to control the press. Thus, during the past war, the press lost some of its freedom even in the most democratic countries, and more in England, which was closer to the enemy, than in America which was further away.

Secondly, there are certain countries which not only have never enjoyed a press free from government control but whose ruling philosophy insists on government ownership and operation of all the communication media.

The Lesson in 1944

What to do when you face—as we do now in Russia—a formidable power that is a one-company, one-newspaper nation, and is determined to "bury" us, and confident our grandchildren will be Communists? Various ideas have been proposed. One of the first to come to naught was a proposal in 1944 by the heads of the AP and the UP—then respectively Kent Cooper and Hugh Baillie—that the U.S. seek to get all other nations to sign a "free news treaty" with us, pledging free and equal dissemination of the news as a prerequisite of peace. I opposed it at the time on the ground that even if signed it would prove to be "a dangerous delusion." Since this delusion has persisted, although it has taken various other forms, let me quote from a talk I gave on the subject on September 29, 1944:

> Suppose that the free news pledge is signed by all the nations, even the governments that allow no freedom of the press at home and that uphold the principle that the government should own and control all the press. What is the result? Will those governments really give foreign correspondents, our correspondents, a freedom that they refuse to allow their own people? Will they allow their people to talk as freely and safely to our correspondents as we allow our people to talk to their correspondents? If not—if the correspondent cannot get news freely, or report it without endangering the life and liberty of his news source and meeting himself all sorts of artificial difficulties designed to make his further work impossible and cause his paper to recall him—if that is the real situation, then where is the reciprocity in the agreement, and what is its value?
>
> ### THE HEART OF THE MATTER
>
> Here is the heart of the matter: There is simply no way in which the press can freely tell the American people of the true state of affairs in our country, and what our government is doing or planning, without all the rest of the world knowing everything that we know. There is simply no way for the British press, or the French press, to tell the British and the French people the true situation in those countries, and what their governments are doing or planning, without every potential enemy knowing as much as they or we know.
>
> That is why a free press and free news can be a most effective engine for peace. The freer the press is in any country, the less possible it is for that country or its government to launch or to prepare to launch war against any other country, least of all the only kind of aggressive war that needs to be feared in these modern times—surprise attack.
>
> But the other side of the medal is this: This situation dangerously exposes the free press countries to aggression by other governments whose control of the press allows them to conceal what they are really planning, allows them to prepare a surprise attack as the Nazis did, and the Japanese did.
>
> ### A REASONABLE GUESS
>
> I do not know from what country aggression may next bring war upon the world, but I am willing to wager that the aggressor government will be a government that controls the press of its country even in peacetime.
>
> Even in the best conditions the danger remains. We have fought on the same side with countries whose government controls the press, where we have all the ties of alliances and comradeship in war to help us work out our relations with them peacefully, where we have the greatest hope that government control of the press may gradually give way to freedom of the press. Even there, I would warn you as earnestly as I can that we are dangerously discouraging freedom of the press in those countries, and dangerously encouraging every aggressive element in them, to gain control of those countries, when we leave the free press democracies divided into sovereign nations, when we fail to unite their power behind their free press as only a common federal union government can unite it.
>
> Let me remind you that in World War I, Italy and Japan were our allies, as Soviet Russia is in this war. I would say that the divisions among the Americans, British and French contributed decisively to deliver Italy to the fascists—I was Rome correspondent of Philadelphia's *Public Ledger* when Mussolini entered that city. I also saw how the divisions among the three great democracies helped decide in favor of the militarists in Japan the struggle between them and the Japanese newspapermen I used to know in the 1920s who were struggling for freedom of the press in Tokyo. I would add that these same divisions contributed decisively, too, to deliver the free press of the Weimar Republic in Germany to the Nazis.
>
> If we are to avoid once again not only losing the peace but seeing even our Allies in one war become our enemies in the next war, if, for example, we are to encourage—as I certainly would—everyone in Soviet Russia who would free the press and live with us in peace, we had better cease to identify the freedom of the press with division, and weakness and anarchy. We had better identify it with the power that comes from free union.
>
> How does division of the free press democracies into sovereign nations encourage militarism abroad? Take the case of Japan. After World War I we sought peace

by a Naval Disarmament treaty based on the theory that we could gain peace by dividing equally the naval power of the Americans and British, and giving the Japanese a lower quota, and the French and Italians a still lower one. Those were the days of peace by the 5-5-3 ratio in naval power—5 for us, 5 for Britain, and 3 for Japan. The result was that the militarists in Japan could hope (a) to build up secretly to greater naval power than either America or Britain, and (b) to keep the two divided and tackle them separately, or to tackle one when the other was engaged in war in Europe. And that is *exactly* what happened.

Had we sought peace in 1920 by uniting the naval power of the democracies, had the ratio been not 5 to 3 but 10 to 3, or 12 to 3—as it would have been by combining the power of the U.S., Britain and France in a Federal Union of the Free—there could have been no such hope to encourage militarism in Japan.

Look at the matter from another angle. Change the date from 1920 to 1950 and change the Big Three from America, Britain and Japan to America, Britain and Soviet Russia. Picture them engaged in the poker game of diplomacy. Picture a poker game in which Uncle Sam and John Bull have all their cards on the table.

Why? Because they have a free press, free speech, free elections, congressional or parliamentary check on the executive. Because their people are accustomed to knowing—and want to continue knowing—how the government spends their taxes, and how it is planning to keep them out of war. We the American people can not know this without the British government and the Russian government, and everyone else, knowing as much about our cards as we do. The same is true of the British people. But it is also true that neither we, nor the British, nor anyone else, can have a better knowledge of the Russian government's game than the Russian people have.

And so an attempt to secure our free press and other freedoms peacefully through a Big Three set-up is like a poker game in which the cards of Uncle Sam and of John Bull are visible on the table, with the searchlight of the press playing on them—and even up their sleeves and under the table to see that nothing phony is going on, and trying . . . with no real success . . . to reach that end of the table where the master of the Soviet press sits with his cards hidden in his hand.

The Challenge and Answer

Such was the picture of 1950 that I painted in the 1944 speech I have been quoting without change—except for some obvious interjections—and you remember what happened in 1950: the surprise attack on Korea.

We have sought to save our great stake in this deadly poker game by trying to get the Master of the Kremlin to play with his cards, too, on the table. When we failed to get him to pledge free dissemination of news, we tried other similar but weaker moves—such as the "open skies" proposal that once made such hopeful headlines though it offered us nothing more in information that a swift bird's-eye view of the surface of vast Russia. We have acclaimed as great successes getting a Nixon talk or a Kennedy speech heard or printed in Russia—in a lop-sided exchange for all the space our press gave the Master of the Kremlin in "exclusive interviews" that so many correspondents have prided themselves on—plus the inevitable blaze of publicity our press invariably gives Mr. K. on his trips here.

We have tried all sorts of ideas and tricks aimed at getting the Master of the Kremlin to unveil at least a part of his hand—methods as superficial as trying to cure smallpox by putting salve on the pocks. They soothed momentarily, they diverted our attention from the real cure, and, whatever the "progress" they seemed to make at the time, they left us always in worse danger. How to meet such a challenge? Let me give the answer I gave in 1944:

> I know of only one way to play safely a game where you have to spread your cards on the table and the other man doesn't. It is to have so strong a hand that nothing can possibly defeat it. To put such strength behind our free principles is a matter of life and death to them, and to us and our children. How can we do this? By ceasing to leave the cards of the democracies divided among a dozen sovereign nation players, by ceasing to play their aces against each other, by putting their cards together in one hand played by a Federal Union of their Sovereign Citizens.

A FREE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

I pointed out then that by uniting our power under a common federal Atlantic government merely for such common purposes as the defense of freedom of the press, the free Atlantic Community would have an unbeatable hand—all four aces, and the joker. And at the end of the war, with much of Russia destroyed, and the U.S. holding an atomic monopoly, an Atlantic Union would have held the Ace of Clubs, (military power), the Ace of Spades (industrial power), the Ace of Diamonds (raw material power), the Ace of Hearts (moral and prestige power) and the Joker—the power to expand all these powers by admitting other democracies to the Union.

Clearly, the free Atlantic Community does not have as great relative power now as it had when the war ended. Why? Because, instead of federating the free, we tried first to gain peace and freedom by the curious idea—once more popular than it is now—that the way to establish law and order was to unite the bad men with the vigilantes and their children, all on an equal basis, in a Virginia City that girdled the globe, called the United Nations. Henry Plummer would have relished this extension of his famous Montana system for getting the law-abiding to strengthen the hand of the lawless. A little following of the Old Trails, which Dean Stone, the man we are honoring tonight, loved to write about, sufficed to keep some of us from being surprised when the United Nations proved ineffective, and the United States had to supplement it with a separate

Vigilante organization of the North Atlantic democracies, known as NATO. But this was merely uniting them in a military alliance—and alliances, as General Eisenhower pointed out in his first report to NATO in 1952, "throughout history have been weak and notoriously inefficient."

The resulting weakness has not yet led us to try to gain by our own free federal principles the unbeatable hand we need in order to win with cards democratically face up. Instead this weakness has led us to try to win by trusting to the dictator's system rather than our own—and turning down our cards too.

SOME OF OUR MISTAKES

Though we have been doing this only little by little, we are doing it more and more. To defend our free rights from Communist invasion we have let our own government increasingly invade those rights itself. We have already gone so far in adding to the power of the military and the industrial "brass" which go hand-in-hand in modern times that even General Eisenhower's farewell advice when leaving the White House stressed the grave danger to democracy that is inherent in this.[1] We have also drifted increasingly toward relying for salvation on such things as secrecy and spying which are as fatal to freedom as they are essential to dictatorship and characteristic of tyranny. Let us at least cease fooling ourselves, and recognize that in adopting these practices we are copying dictators—not our Founding Fathers.

True, one must sometimes fight fire with fire, but we have already had occasion to learn—with the U-2 and Cuba, for example—that we can burn ourselves that way more than we do the enemy. How badly must we burn ourselves before we fight fire with less dangerous and despotic means?

True, in the past it has proved safe for our democracy to sacrifice freedom of the press and other freedoms and submit to such things as censorship in time of war. But in the past we have done this for never more than four years . . . and our present gradual enthronement of these methods of despotism and militarism has now already gone on for 17 years—ever since 1945. Worse still, though we have changed administrations three times in these 17 years, spokesmen of the present one tell us even more insistently than did their predecessors that we must reconcile ourselves to "enduring the present tensions for many years to come." Ten years ago they spoke of "perhaps 30 years of tension to come." Now they warn us of endless years, with no *perhaps* about it.

TERMITES OF TYRANNY

How long can the structure of our freedom stand up while it is being eaten away from within, year after year, by these termites of tyranny—by a spy system that is already vast, and has billions to spend without any real accounting to us; by mushrooming governmental secrecy, already covering conveniently no small amount of corruption, inefficiency and blundering; and by concentrated power in a few men—money power, military power, punishing-without-due-process-power, pushbutton power—already far greater than such concentrated power was in World War II?

Twenty one years of this already—if we go back to the beginning in 1941. Americans are now being drafted into the armed forces who never lived under any other regime than this. With 30 more years of this situation, two generations of Americans . . . parents and children . . . will have grown from infancy to manhood in an ever more rottening structure of freedom—which continues to appear from the outside deceptively solid. How long can we let tyranny's termites feed on our freedom, and hope to have any of it left for our grandchildren? Is it surprising that Mr. K., as he watches us practicing his political principles instead of our own, confidently predicts that our grandchildren will be the subjects of history's worst type of dictatorship?

You may think I am too alarmist. That is what people thought in 1944 when I warned of that postwar poker game with our Soviet ally.

Let me tell you a little incident that indicates how far the termites have already gone. I was talking only last month to a former Cabinet member—one of the men who was closest to his President. I was telling him of the talk I had had that day with a man who has held very high office under more than one President, and who had given me some very disquieting information about the possibility of Mr. K. risking atomic war. The former Cabinet officer was as impressed as I had been; he said: "I must phone him about this." Then he added, as if thinking out loud: "No, I'd better not talk to him on the phone on such a subject. I'll arrange to see him." Clearly he felt he could no longer trust our once trustworthy telephone in a discussion of even this subject, which was not tagged "secret" or "classified." And already he took this telephone tapping as a matter of course, to be accepted without complaint.

Where will we be after this termite of tyranny has gone on gnawing away for even 10 years more?

The contrast between the policy of the American

[1]On Jan. 17, 1961, President Eisenhower warned: "In the councils of our government we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence . . . by the military-industrial complex . . . We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties." And he warned against another enemy that is growing like a mushroom in the dark: "We must also be alert to . . . the danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite."

Society of Newspaper Editors right after the war and now is another significant indication of how the security for freedom of the press has meanwhile declined. Around 1946 I recall attending a dinner of the ASNE where the guests of honor were Russian editors whose trip through the U.S. the Society, as I recall, had sponsored in the hope that if they only saw with their own eyes the contrast that our freedom offered they would return home converts to freedom. (That basic idea has died hard—if it has yet died—for I recall attending another ASNE dinner only a few years ago, just after Castro came to power, when Castro was the guest of honor.) But since 1946 the situation in Washington itself has so deteriorated that in recent years one of the major fights of the ASNE has been to preserve free information in the U.S. from the trend to "classify" as secret more and more information that once was public.

With such termites gnawing away, the wonder to me is not that Senator Goldwater should attack the Administration policy as a "No Win" policy. The wonder is that his opponents should do so little to rouse the public to the gravity of the danger to freedom inherent in any policy that presupposes that our democratic structure can withstand indefinitely the termites that flourish in such prolonged conditions of tension. Only the most radical extremists will grow in these conditions, and the way they are already growing is in itself another ominous sign.

THE ONLY SAFE POLICY FOR FREEDOM

For more than a quarter century I have contended that the only safe policy for freedom is one that promises—and can reasonably hope to deliver—decisive victory in good time. All that has happened in that quarter century makes me believe this only the more firmly now. But this does not mean that I share the view that the alternative to the "No Win" policy is to seek to win by war. That is a fearfully dangerous alternative, and one that I have always sought to avoid. With the exception of the period when we were already in World War II, my aim, before that period and ever since, has been to win for freedom *without* another world war, by the only means that permit this—by putting behind freedom in good time the proverbial power that lies in union; in other words, by federating the free Atlantic peoples.

Although Atlantica can not gain—alas—as much power by federation today as it could have gained by union in 1939, or in 1949, or in 1959, it can still gain by union now enough power to turn the tide decisively, I believe, and win without war. I give my reasons for that estimate in chapter 2 of my current book, *Freedom's Frontier—Atlantic Union Now.* Tonight I have time to say only:

Rate freedom's existing power as you will; by federating it politically and economically we would certainly make it much greater than that of the United States alone. Mr. K. could no longer hope to surpass it by 1970, or 2000. Moreover, in that period federation would immensely stimulate the growth of freedom's power in every field—not only in per capita production and standards of living, but on the political, military, scientific, educational and moral sides. These factors are so interrelated that, when combined the Federal Union way, their power becomes immensely greater than by any other combination of them. Federation raises their power as a straight flush does that of five cards.

You may think that instead of five aces—as in 1939 and 1949—freedom now holds only an ace, king, queen, jack and ten. If those cards are combined the alliance or confederation way, in different "sovereign" suits, you have only a "straight," which is not too hard to beat in the poker game the world is in.

If, however, all five cards belong to the same suit, this one change, which seems so slight, makes the hand 255 times stronger—an unbeatable royal flush. Similarly, when freedom's power is no longer divided among different nations but united in one Atlantic Federal Union, its hand becomes unbeatable.

THE POWER OF ATLANTICA

The Atlantic community has not yet begun to gain the strength that comes from organic Union. Here is our vast reservoir of unused power. It costs us nothing to harness this power—except the loss of prejudices and ideas that are contrary to our basic free principles. The power Atlantica would gain is not only the cheapest, but the kind that would most impress Moscow, and Peking, for three reasons:

First, the Communists have made a fetish of unity. They have carried their "monolithic" unity to the extreme of tyranny. They bank on this extreme unity, which is inherent in Communism, and on the extreme disunity which they believe is inherent in free enterprise and individual liberty, to deliver our grandchildren to their system. The glasses that we Atlanticans wear magnify for us even microscopic dangers and difficulties to freedom in union—but those that the Communists wear magnify immensely in their eyes the proverbial strength and other advantages that Atlantic Union would bring us.

Secondly, the Communists know that they cannot possibly begin to compete with us in the kind of power that union brings. For one thing, they have already practically exhausted this resource, which we Atlanticans have hardly started to harness. They have carried unity to such extremes that the Kremlin is now trying to decentralize industry to some degree to increase efficiency. And they know that whereas the assets they had, or have, are relatively little

developed, the nations of Atlantica include the most highly-developed ones on earth; they have the kind of assets whose power can be most quickly multiplied by the inherent magic of union.

Atlantic Union would most impress the Communists because, thirdly, it would come with the force of surprise as would nothing else we could do. One reason why may suffice. The creation of this Union by common agreement would prove that a basic Marxist dogma is unfounded. The Communists believe that "greed for profits" must inevitably drive the capitalist countries into cut-throat competition and conflict for markets. This has all too often been true, but the Thirteen States, by their great experiment in Federal Union, proved that free enterprise states can—by applying between them their basic principles instead of sacrificing them—create a much richer common market. From it everyone benefits, by the elimination of trade barriers and other nationalistic rivalry, and by the continued competition of free enterprise. The latter requires that the competition be the peaceful, healthy one between citizens or corporations. The unhealthy, war-producing competition of nations results from the doctrine of national sovereignty—not from the principles of capitalism. The latter are, in fact, contrary to that doctrine.

By taking the road to Atlantic Federation we knock out this keystone of Communist ideology. We prove that "St." Lenin and "St." Marx were completely wrong in their teachings on his essential point. We cannot deliver a blow that is more bewildering and devastating to the Marxists, inside and outside Russia, than this is.

In these and other ways Atlantic Union now would not merely provide the unbeatable hand that freedom must have to win while continuing to play with cards face up, but would set in motion forces that would end, I believe, —for reasons I explain in chapters 12 and 13 of *Freedom's Frontier*—in the eventual breakdown of the Communist dictatorship from within.

THE ENCOURAGING SUPPORT

Here is a way to meet the challenge freedom faces that would save freedom by applying our own time-tested free federal principles to create the United States of Atlantica—not by hoping merely to edge ahead in the present neck-and-neck arms race which is bound to end in suicidal war, nor by continuing to deliver freedom gradually to dictatorship, from within, without a struggle, through the termites of tyranny that fatten on unending years of tension.

Here is a policy that has long enjoyed very respectable support—not a crackpot to the carload—and has gained increasingly impressive backing in recent years.

Let me cite quickly only four items.

1. In 1960 both Houses of Congress, after 12 years of consideration, authorized the creation of a U.S. Citizens Commission on NATO and empowered it to organize an Atlantic Convention of citizen delegates from the NATO nations to explore stronger Atlantic unification.

2. In January 1962 this Atlantic Convention met for 10 days in Paris. It was composed of 90 distinguished delegates under the chairmanship of former Secretary of State Herter. It ended its debates with a unanimous Declaration that "our survival as free men, and the possibility of progress for all men, demand the creation of a true Atlantic Community within the next decade," and an urgent recommendation "that the NATO Government promptly establish a special Governmental Commission to draw up plans within two years for the creation of a true Atlantic Community, suitably organized to meet the political, military and economic challenges of this era."

3. The International Movement for Atlantic Union, whose president I have the honor to be, began less than two years ago to organize a small Honorary Council and a somewhat larger Advisory Council as a means of mobilizing leaders who were ready to stand up and be counted for outright Atlantic "federation." Its Honorary Council now includes Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, the Earl of Avon (formerly Prime Minister Eden), former Secretary of State Herter, former Foreign Ministers Beyen of Holland, von Brentano of Germany, Martino of Italy, Pearson of Canada; former Premiers Schumann of France and van Zeeland of Belgium. The lastest to join is former NATO Secretary General Spaak, now Belgian Foreign Minister—the first such minister in office to do this.

The Advisory Council has more than 400 members from all walks of life, an even more distinguished and representative cross section of the Atlantic Community than was the Atlantic Convention. We have not yet published this list—but I'll give you a quick taste: Lord Aldington, vice president of the British Conservative party; Warren Atherton, former national commander of the American Legion; William Bennett, premier of British Columbia; Arthur Burns, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers to President Eisenhower, and Leon Keyserling, its chairman under President Truman; Gaston Eyskens, former premier of Belgium; Admiral Thomas Kinkaid; Herschel Newsom, master of the National Grange; Paul Rykens, retired chairman of Unilever, The Netherlands; Maurice Schumann, recently named Minister of National Planning in France; Governor John Volpe of Massachusetts.

4. As recently as February 9, I had the pleasure of seeing the first presidential aspirant come out squarely for Federal Union of the Free. Ending his three Godkin

Lectures at Harvard on "The Future of Federalism," Governor Nelson Rockefeller said: "The federal idea, which our Founding Fathers applied in their historic act of creation in the 18th century, can be applied in the 20th century in the larger context of the world of free nations—if we will but match our forefathers in courage and vision . . . Sweeping as this assertion may be, I believe it to be anything but an academic proposition. Quite the contrary, it is a matter of cold political realism . . . Anything less than a grand design—a major idea and a lofty sense of purpose—is too puny for the times in which we live."

The Disappointing Press

Such is the newsworthy support that this policy of Atlantic Union has been getting in recent years. But how much of this news have you read in the press, or heard over the air? Here is a policy for saving the freedom of the press, and all our freedoms, that you might think a good many papers would crusade for—if only from self interest. Here is a policy whose rise you might think would be carefully followed and fully reported in a free press.

What does the record show? As an old newspaperman, still in love with the profession and fully aware of its difficulties, I regret deeply to have to report that precious few papers have adequately reported this story, and the great majority have almost always ignored it, or played it down. Even fewer—a very precious few—have crusaded for it in the grand tradition of the free press.

THE LONELY SPLENDOR

The newspaper that shines out in both respects in lonely splendor is not, I am saddened to say, my old paper, *The New York Times,* but the *Memphis* (Tenn.) *Press-Scimitar.* Its editor, Edward Meeman, is one of the truly great editors of our country. I wish I had time to tell you of how he has handled this story in the 15 years I have followed his work, and of the truly astonishing products and by-products that have resulted in city, state, national and international affairs. These results have included the decisive defeat of the Crump machine in Memphis, its replacement with a commission government, the election of Estes Kefauver as U.S. Senator and the start of his career as a candidate for the presidency, and through his untiring work at home and abroad, the bringing about of that Atlantic Convention of which I spoke. Some day historians will wonder why our generation hasn't had imagination and judgment enough yet to give Edward Meeman all the Pulitzer prizes, melted into one. What he has done shows most devastatingly what the press might have done everywhere—and can still do. Instead—well, let me go back to those four developments I mentioned, and tell you very briefly how the press generally handled this story:

1. The road the Atlantic Convention resolution traveled through Congress was beset with conflict after conflict; it offered at least half a dozen good news pegs in a year. But if the A.P., U.P.I. and such papers as *The New York Times* hung a single paragraph on these pegs, our search has not revealed it. Consider a few of the items that were ignored: Item one—Secretary Herter reversed the Acheson-Dulles policy of 10-years standing on this proposal. Item two—the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted it out 8 to 7. Item three—the Senate passed it after long debate by a vote of only 51 to 44, witnessed by at least 20 reporters in the press gallery (I saw them), with every presidential candidate in the Senate voting for it, and Vice President Nixon, who didn't need to stick his neck out, giving it the public endorsement that put it through while Senators Kennedy and Johnson voted yes but said nothing. Item four—the House Committee approved it unanimously in an election year despite the close Senate vote. Item five—the House, after killing six innocent-looking but fatal amendments on the floor, passed it 288 to 103. And not a word about any of these stories in the leading papers of the country—except three or four lines in fine print in the summaries of bills passed by Congress in *The New York Times* and *Washington Post.*

2. Turn to the Atlantic Convention. Our press did give this meeting wide news and editorial attention, just before it met and during the first two of its 10 days—particularly Mr. Herter's keynote speech. But thereafter, it dropped the discussion—except to report such world-shaking news that some of the delegates had gone to Berlin and seen the Wall, or gone to the Arc de Triomphe in Paris and laid a wreath on the Unknown Soldier's Tomb.

When the Convention reached its conclusions and issued its Declaration, which I have quoted, the U.P.I. and A.P. sent good stories—but our clipping service showed that far fewer papers printed anything about the unanimous recommendations of those 90 eminent Atlanticans compared to those who reported the keynote speech of one U.S. delegate. Still fewer among those who had editorialized on the prospects of the meeting expressed any opinion on the results. *The New York Times,* I am glad to say, was this time a shining exception: It ran three editorials in a fortnight on the Convention and found that "Atlantic Union is on the march . . begins to look like a historic inevitability."

But the only paper in the world which covered every day of the Convention through a special correspondent it had sent to Paris was the *Memphis Press-Scimitar,* whose Milt Britten did so excellent a job that a number of other Scripps-Howard papers also ran his dispatches.

3. Turn now to all those former prime ministers and

foreign ministers who have come out for Atlantic Federal Union by joining the Honorary Council of the International Movement. When these men make a speech, the press reports it. Believe me, it is far harder to get such statesmen to commit themselves continuously to Atlantic federation than to say some pious generalities on Atlantic unity in a soon forgotten speech. Yet, though a press release was given on each statesman who joined the IMAU Council, and the significance of his action was made clear, the only one to get even a paragraph was, to my knowledge, Mr. Herter—in *The New York Times.*

4. I come to the last of my four illustrations—Governor Rockefeller's Harvard Lectures. *The New York Times* gave them a column—but no editorial, as yet. The agencies sent good stories, and the *Washington Post, Providence Journal* and *San Francisco Chronicle* ran editorials adequately reflecting the importance of the story. But the number of important leaders who had not heard of the Governor's stand when I spoke to them about it and to whom I was the first to bring any news of this important development speaks for itself on the press, TV-radio coverage of this event. And, it was an event. I have waited so long—more than a quarter century—to see a presidential aspirant take this kind of stand for the federalist principles of the Founding Fathers that I'm now expecting to see, at long last, man bite dog on the next street corner.

'A CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE'

What is the explanation of this record of the freest press on earth on this story that has in it all the elements of a good news story, and more—that has in it even history, history in the making? It is not surprising that some find a sinister explanation, a "conspiracy of silence,"—and they are not all laymen. So experienced a veteran newspaperman as W. K. Kelsey wrote in the Detroit *News-Times* just before the Atlantic Convention met: "Perhaps the American press will break what has appeared to be a conspiracy of silence regarding this affair's genesis and development . . . It [the Convention] is worth watching—if we are permitted to watch."

I happen to know the reasons for this veteran's doubt that the press would permit the public to watch this Convention; perhaps I'll have time to tell them to the students at the School of Journalism of Montana State University where I speak tomorrow morning. All I can say here is that he has good cause to be cynical, but still I'm not. The layman may think that the press plays up the dangers of dictatorship and war, and the billions spent for security via an armaments rat race, so that continuing billions will be spent on this empty answer—and part of the money will reach the press in advertising and circulation. I don't wonder that this may seem to be a plausible explanation to those who don't know the newspaper game from the inside as I do—but it is not the explanation to me and I feel sure it wasn't what Mr. Kelsey meant.

To me the explanation is nothing so juicy or sensational. It is simply that the press has fallen into some bad ruts—or rather, has gradually dug itself into some dangerous ruts—in its evaluations of what is news, and what is the role of the press in a society of free people. What these ruts are—that is another speech, and the hour is late.

The Conclusion

I do not expect the press soon to give the same attention to efforts to win for freedom by effective union, without war, that it gives to the attempt to win by disguised disunion, and spending billions on arms. Nor am I such an optimist as to expect the press to be good enough—for quite a while—to play up the efforts to unite the free as much as it does the evidence of disunity in NATO.

But is it too much to hope that the press and TV will cease building up the "lunatic fringe" on the right and left, by giving the publicity it does to the most crackpot Birchite allegations, and to picketing at the White House for the most half-baked plans for peace and disarmament? Is it too much to ask that the press should treat such items as less important news than the efforts of reasonable men, with highly respectable support, to avoid the twin dangers of war and of endless tension and win decisively for freedom of the press by time-tested plans—even though they do not resort to wild denunciations or sensational methods, but appeal to sober common sense?

Surely it is not too much to hope that the news and editorial pages should at least cease to play down or ignore major developments in this field. Indeed, I would hope for a little more than that. I would hope that newspapermen and newscasters and schools of journalism would take a fresh look, a hard look, at their present criteria for deciding what is news, and for evaluating its relative importance and general interest, and at the responsibility of the press to take an active hand in meeting constructively the present challenge to its freedom. I would suggest that they investigate whether they have not gradually sunk into some very deep ruts in all these regards—ruts that are not in their interest nor in the public interest, and that are highly dangerous to continued freedom of the press in the world we live in now.

I would like to see Montana help lead the way to a better sense of news values and press responsibilities. I feel sure that nothing could so please Dean Stone than that we, his foster children, should blaze new trails when old ones lead to dark and bloody ground.

Report from Rome

IN ITALY: THE WORD IS COMPLICATED

By *FRANK BRUTTO*

One of America's ablest foreign correspondents, FRANK BRUTTO *has for many years been bureau chief of the Associated Press in Rome. He is a 1929 graduate of the MSU School of Journalism.*

In Italy, a nation where Roman Catholicism is the state religion and the Communist party the second strongest in the land, one would expect politics to be complicated. They are. So are the nation's communications which—with a few wrinkles—fit the politics as a glove fits the fingers of the hand. Each political party has its official mouthpiece to interpret the day's news to its own best advantage. That is just the beginning.

Additionally, there is a weekly flurry of magazines with political messages from the parties and their leaders and a mess of printed and mimeographed freely-distributed services to advance the particular attitudes and thoughts of factions within each party.

Italy's state-controlled radio (annual tax $5) and television (annual tax $20) have little political content, but this could change with the recent opening of a second television channel. The nation's motion picture makers, entranced as those of other nations with box office, Bible, sex and muscles, occasionally prod realistically at the poverty that still exists in the midst of Italy's economic boom and produce a film with social and, hence, political impact. Such a picture was "Rocco and His Brothers." It told the story of a southern farm family that left its pinched plot of land to seek work in one of Italy's northern industrial cities. Hundreds of thousands of Italians have participated in this continuing migration. Their plight is politically explosive. The motion pictures have touched it. The press is beginning to take notice.

Frequently, especially at election time, some of the deftest thrusts are made with pamphlets, leaflets and posters used with a verve and skill seldom seen in other countries.

Soviet Russia's renewal of nuclear tests, for instance, brought out on the streets of Rome and other Italian cities and towns a poster showing a death-head female entitled "Miss Russia, 1961," and another skull-and-bones job inscribed: "For a radioactive future join the Communist party."

Such posters are effective and easily understood in a land whose press in engaged in a constant and usually involved debate that is complicated by pro-Catholic gestures in the Communist newspapers and unremitting attack by the Vatican's *L'Osservatore Romano* and other Catholic periodicals against Marxism in general and atheistic Communism in particular.

THE COMMUNIST PRESS

Only in Italy could you have the spectacle of Communist-line *Paese Sera* of Rome, for example, bannering across its entire front page the news that Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had sent birthday greetings to Pope John XXIII.

"This," exulted *Paese Sera,* "is the first time that it has happened since 1917, that is since the October Revolution."

Paese Sera's treatment reflected the Communist endeavor in a nation whose vast majority is Roman Catholic. It followed the policy set shortly after the war by Moscow-trained Palmiro Togliatti, Italy's Communist boss, when he and other Communist deputies voted to include in the nation's new Republican Constitution the Lateran Pacts signed in 1929 by the Vatican and Italy's fascist regime.

Italy's Communist leaders have doggedly sought to convince the Italian Roman Catholic voter that insofar as his religion is concerned he has nothing to fear from Communism—an idea that is hard to sell and that the Vatican's *L'Osservatore Romano* and other Catholic periodicals refuse to buy.

Nonetheless, a measure of Communist success in this approach is reflected by the fact that the extreme left in Italy (the Communists and the Marxist Italian Socialist party of Pietro Nenni) have consistently polled more than a third of the Italian vote (a combined 37 per cent in the 1958 elections against the dominant Christian Democrats' 42 per cent). As this is written, Christian Democrat Premier Amintore Fanfani faces a new government crisis distinguished from past and frequent crises by increasing pressure for the so-called *"apertura a sinistra"*—opening to the left. Specifically, this means collaboration with Nenni's Socialists who have been trying to prove—not too successfully—that they have broken old ties that bound them with the Communist party. One of Nenni's frequently proclaimed aims is nationalization of public utilities.

Where does all this—here broadly and lightly sketched—leave the frequently pardonably puzzled Italian reader, radio listener, television viewer? He has at his disposal a confusing mass of periodicals whose initial reports after an election—for example—can make him wonder who won. Eventually, of course, it is ironed out.

THE NEWS AGENCIES

Backbone of the Italian news report today is ANSA (*Agenzia Nazionale Stampa Associata*), whose national and international news coverage goes virtually to every Italian newspaper. It is the successor of the old pre-war Stefani and is generally pro-government. Italy's more important newspapers also have their own correspondents at home and a few abroad.

Another news service that should be mentioned is the Associated Press, established in Italy—as in many other countries—after the war. Its services also go to almost every newspaper in Italy. It does not service Italian news within Italy, but its presence here has provided an element of news competition that was lacking in the days of Stefani and its exchange of news with the world's other big national agencies. Reuters and United Press International are distributed in Italy through ANSA.

PRESS AND BIG INDUSTRY

Italy's independent press, or rather the press that is not directly dependent upon a political party, is almost wholly controlled by big industry, just as the Anaconda Company until recently controlled a group of Montana newspapers. But the Italian newspapers thus controlled are much more politically enmeshed and active than were the Anaconda papers in the more recent years of their publication under the aegis of the big corporation. Turin's *La Stampa,* for example, one of the best newspapers in Italy, is Fiat controlled, just as is the city's major league soccer team.

A notable exception to this general rule is Milan's conservative *Corriere della Sera,* before the war one of the world's top newspapers and now again one of the best. Other important so-called independent newspapers in Italy—to name only a few—include Rome's morning *Il Messagggero* and *Il Tempo* and the afternoon *Il Giornale d'Italia.* There are many others. In Rome alone more than a score of daily newspapers of all political shades are published, most of them subsidized by a party, by industry or by some wealthy man whose income is derived from other means than publishing.

Financial newspapers, which also concern themselves with politics, include Milan's *24 Ore* and *Il Globo* and Rome's *Ore 12.*

OTHER LEADING PUBLICATIONS

The leading political newspapers, directly financed by the parties and serving as their official organs, include:

Il Popolo, official organ of the Christian Democrat party that has been in power virtually since the end of the war.

L'Unita, official organ of the Italian Communist party.

L'Avanti, official organ of the Italian Socialist party.

Il Paese and *Paese Sera* of Rome, morning and afternoon pro-Communist newspapers which are sharply edited and especially active in social crusades and attacks upon the corruption that pops up from time to time.

La Giustizia, official organ of the Socialist Democrat party headed by Giuseppe Saragat, which generally collaborates with or supports the Christian Democrat government.

Il Secolo, official organ of the fascistic Italian Social Movement party.

There are also official publications for the republican, liberal and monarchist parties.

VATICAN'S L'OSSERVATORE ROMANO

One of the most important newspapers in Italy which is not political but which, nonetheless, has as much political impact as any, is, of course, the Vatican's *L'Osservatore Romano.* It is among the most respected and most widely quoted, both nationally and abroad. More frankly political than *L'Osservatore* is Rome's *Il Quotidiano,* the official organ of Italian Catholic Action, whose four million members fight Communism in Italy on man-to-man and cell-by-cell basis. These are only two of many Catholic newspapers and periodicals in Italy. The others

include such strong voices as *L'Italia* in Milan and *L'Avvenire* of Bologna.

To the political expressions of the newspapers must be added those of scores of magazines, some of them aimed at youth and at women. The Communist party's *Vie Nuove* (*New Roads*) and *Noi Donne* (*We Women*) are good examples. But even the dozens of weekly magazines, including those whose covers are brightened with photographs of Sophia Loren, Gina Lollobrigida and other assorted Latin lovelies, are loaded with politics. Some of them are also loaded with advertising and are a better reflection of Italy's economic progress than is the daily press.

INFLUENCE OF THE PRESS

How much political influence does this varied press have on the Italian voter? Probably not much. A good many Italians are not avid readers. The Communist may read *L'Unita* or *Paese Sera* because he is a member of the party, and it is doubtful if the newspapers make converts to the party. But they do help keep them faithful.

The newspaper reader on the bus or tram on the way to work is more apt to be reading one of the big-circulation sport newspapers to check the weekly soccer pool. The girl on the bus is most likely to be deep in a cheap romantic magazine.

In the end, the Italian voter is more apt to be politically moved—to give one example—by his electric bill, a regular communication that reaches just about every household in the nation. Electric bills are very high in Italy.

*A Tribute to Dean A. L. Stone**

By *CLARENCE K. STREIT*

Our family moved from Missouri to Missoula in the Spring of 1911 when I was 15. I had been raising chickens in Missouri; I brought with me my proudest possession, an incubator I had bought with my profits. The incubator hatched more than 100 chicks a few days after our arrival; we had no place for them, and besides a few whiffs of Montana air had made me want to fly higher than chickens can. So I decided to leave the chicken business. To dispose of these chicks I put a classified ad in the *Missoulian.* All it said was, "Young chicks for sale, 20c each." I still remember it, partly because I had asked a price so high with much hesitation, for I thought myself lucky in 1911 in Missouri to get 20c for a dozen eggs—and partly because we sold all those hundred chicks at that price. Thus it was that I quickly learned that Montana is high, wide and handsome, and became aware of what a wonderful paper the *Missoulian* was in those days when A. L. Stone was its editor.

Part of the inimitable flavor he gave the paper—and I have never since encountered a newspaper for which I had the same feeling—was the column he wrote on the back page each day. I was soon reading the whole paper, and first of all that column, before breakfast—too much before breakfast, in fact. For the second job I got in 1911—the first one was night elevator boy in the Florence Hotel, from 7 p.m. to 7 a.m.—was delivering the *Missoulian* on a South Side route. That meant getting up at 5 a.m. and enduring hardships which, during a blizzard in February 1913 inspired my first published poem. To my great joy the *Missoulian* published all 11 stanzas, under the headline, "Carrier's Misery Pictured by C.K.S."

Before leaving Missouri, I had decided that I would be a newspaperman, and the example Editor Stone set removed all my doubts—his would be my career. His children were among my closest high school friends. My first Montana camping trip—in September, 1911—was with Emerson and Percy Stone; my first date was Charlotte Stone; I was often at their home on East Pine Street and thus came to appreciate what a remarkable woman Mr. Stone had picked for their mother, and I suffered with them at her premature death. In 1913 with Mr. Stone's encouragement I started the Missoula High School paper, *The Konah,* which was printed in the *Missoulian* plant.

Then in 1914, when Editor Stone left the *Missoulian* to become Dean—the name by which so many thereafter came to love him—when he became Dean of the School of Journalism which then began its career in army tents on the University campus, I was fortunate enough to be one of his tiny freshman class. Until we entered World War I in 1917 and I volunteered, I studied under Dean Stone in the "Shack"—which replaced those tents—the basic principles and high ideals of journalism. I had the further good fortune to be taught them too, as a cub reporter, by the best proof of how good the Dean's training was—his oldest son, George, then a reporter on the *Missoulian.* George, who became my dearest friend, remains in my mind the finest merger of reporter and man I have ever known. He soon became a star reporter in Chicago and only his untimely death in his 30s kept the country from recognizing him, as all who knew him did—as a star indeed.

I trust you will not think I am reminiscing too much, but I could not pay a little interest on the debt I owe Dean Stone without including homage, also, to George—his pride and glory as father, as editor, and as teacher.

There is much more in my heart about Dean Stone but I shall mention only one other thing. After *Union Now* appeared in 1939 I made, to me, the very hard decision of leaving a profession—that of reporter—which I loved, and a newspaper, *The New York Times,* which remains to me the world's best. I was encouraged to decide right by the fact that Dean Stone, much as he regretted my leaving *The Times* and daily journalism, felt it even more important that a man should devote himself to trying to achieve what he deeply believed in, however utopian it might seem to others. At the first talk I made here in this city on *Union Now,* Dean Stone introduced me—in a way that left nothing to be desired—except a man ten times better than I, to prove the Dean was at least half right.

*Excerpts of the Dean A. L. Stone Address at the Montana State University School of Journalism on May 6, 1962.

Report from Vienna

IN AUSTRIA:

THE PRESS WALKS A TIGHTROPE

By *DONALD F. GRAFF*

A 1951 graduate of the MSU School of Journalism, DONALD F. GRAFF *is now bureau chief of Radio Free Europe in Vienna, Austria. Before he went to Vienna this year, Mr. Graff was for many years head of the Radio Free Europe bureau in Stockholm, Sweden.*

Metternich supposedly once remarked that the Balkans begin at the Wiedner Hauptstrasse, then as now one of Vienna's principal thoroughfares. The prince-chancellor's observation may have applied specifically to the peculiar character more than a century ago of the polyglot capital of a polyglot empire, yet one hears it quoted frequently in the Vienna of today, where it serves to point up the somewhat schizoid nature of a city on the surface as prosperous as most other West European capitals.

Vienna's public face is one of Western glitter and affluence, perhaps unfortunately so in some respects. The main streets are aglare with neon, shop windows on Kaerntnerstrasse and Mariahilferstrasse put on as lavish a show as can be found on similar streets in Paris, Milan and Brussels and, as elsewhere in the West, the traffic problem is monumental. These and other less superficial similarities to contemporary Western Europe are not illusion. Vienna is of the West. Yet one need not be long in the city before also noting something of the East.

There is more than a hint of this Eastern flavor in Viennese names, as they appear on shop fronts, in the press, in the telephone directory. As well represented as the Schmidts and Schulzes are names of Czech and Hungarian, Polish, Slovak and Serbo-Croat origin. This may be largely a heritage of the Hapsburg era, when a western capital extended its influence to the east and in the process became itself easternized to some extent. It is, however, one minor indication that Vienna remains what it has been for generations, if not centuries—a melange straddling two worlds, a point where the West both begins and ends.

This halfway position is brought home topically and grimly by a short drive to the east. Less than a hour from Vienna are the watch towers, minefields and barbed wire of the Czechoslovak and Hungarian frontiers, the beginning not of the Balkans but of another and fundamentally hostile, suspicious world.

The point in all of this is to underline the situation of Vienna and Austria today—on the border between and to some extent a part of both East and West, open to influences and pressures from both and compelled to coexist somehow with both. The effects are felt in every major field of public activity, in business and politics and not least by the press.

THE VIENNESE PRESS

The Austrian press of any importance is, basically, the Viennese press. With perhaps one notable exception—the highly conservative and moderately influential *Salzburger Nachrichten*—the provincial press is very provincial indeed. This press, in the European tradition, is highly political in terms both of attitudes and of direct affiliation with parties or semi-political interests such as the trade unions, although again there is an important exception in independent and highly respected *Die Presse* of Vienna.

As could be expected, the press reflects positions and divisions of Austrian politics and plays an important role in political activity. But it does so within the limits of a generally accepted concept of the national welfare to a degree which is unusual in an uncontrolled press, in Europe or anywhere else. This and certain peculiarities in the structure of the press are a clear reflection of, and best

explained by, certain peculiarities of Austria's current political scene and recent history.

While Austria functions as a parliamentary democracy, the government has a monolithic cast. In Austria's case, however, it is not one-party domination but joint monopoly of government by two co-equal parties, the Austrian People's Party (conservative) and the Socialist Party. Conservatives and Socialists, who fought each other bitterly during the two decades between the end of World War I and the 1938 *Anschluss,* have shared power in a coalition regime since 1945 when the four post-war occupying powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France—assented to establishment of a national government with broad authority throughout all four occupation zones. (The Austrian Communist party also participated in the initial coalition, but long since has been eliminated from the government.) The idea behind the partnership of the country's two most powerful but basically antagonistic political groupings was to submerge internal partisanship in the interests of preserving Austria's national integrity during a foreign occupation of indefinite duration.

In this, the coalition was successful. In 1955, Austria emerged from 10 years of occupation with freedom of movement on the international scene restricted, but intact as a national entity, in full control of internal political affairs and with a national consciousness, a sense of being "Austrian," stronger than ever before had existed.

THE COALITION CONCEPT

But by this time, the coalition concept had come to be accepted as something of a built-in feature of Austrian political life. The end of the occupation did not usher in an era of freer interplay of political forces and variation in government composition. Instead, the two-party coalition has continued to the present day and there is no indication of any fundamental change in the situation in the foreseeable future.

The reasons advanced are valid enough. Austria in international affairs is neutral, a policy supported by the major political parties and the majority of the population. Still, Austrian neutrality is not of the Swedish and Swiss variety, wholly a matter of self-determined national policy. It is written into the 1955 State Treaty which ended the occupation and thus leaves Austria unusually vulnerable to outside pressure. And apart from the restrictive treaty clauses, Austria's exposed position on the border between East and West makes a policy of national unity of vital importance. National unity in contemporary Austria is defined as continuation of the two-party coalition.

The coalition set-up gives the government a peculiarly two-headed character. The two parties still have no great love for each other and campaign actively against each other in national elections, but never with the idea of breaking up the coalition. Top posts are parcelled out on the basis of fractional voting advantages one party may have scored over the other (at present, Austria has a People's Party chancellor, a Socialist vice chancellor, a Socialist foreign minister, etc.), and it is standard practice that each government department has in effect two chiefs, one from each party.

HYBRID POLITICAL STRUCTURE REFLECTED

The press reflects this hybrid political structure. The Socialists have their own organ in *Arbeiter Zeitung.* The *Oesterreichische Tageszeitung* is owned by and speaks for the People's Party. *Neues Oesterreich* is jointly controlled by the two parties and is operated as the organ of the coalition government. So it goes.

Political infighting in the press can be brisk. It has picked up recently with the proposal of the People's Party for parliamentary elections this year, probably in the autumn, rather than the spring of 1963 as originally scheduled. Yet while political comment may be sharp, it remains within the limits imposed by the necessity of maintaining national unity and does not seriously question the continuation of the coalition government as symbol and vehicle of that unity.

The press reached this present state in much the same fashion as did the two parties. Austria's pre-war press also was highly political, but during the gray years between the two world wars it reflected and contributed to the bitter political partisanship which paralyzed the country and prevented development of an Austrian national consciousness in the German-speaking remnant of the Hapsburg empire. To some extent, it killed itself as a vital force by failing—with the exception of *Die Freie Presse,* predecessor of *Die Presse*—to speak out for an Austrian rather than for partisan viewpoints. With the folding of *Arbeiter Zeitung* and other opposition voices in 1934, when conservatives under Dolfuss triumphed after 15 years of civil struggle between left and right, a free press for all practical purposes came to an end, although *Die Freie Presse* carried on until 1938 and the arrival of the Nazis.

THE REBORN PRESS

There was no press when the occupying powers set up shop in Vienna in the spring of 1945. The first newspapers to appear were established by and under the direct control of the occupation forces. Later that year, when the supply of newsprint and of journalists returning from concentration camps and military prisons had become more plentiful, purely Austrian papers began to appear. The reborn press dedicated itself, as did the coalition government, to preserving Austria's national integrity during the

occupation period. That it played a significant role in this cause, particularly in opposing extension of Communist influence, is widely recognized and as a result the press continues to enjoy a high degree of public respect and influence.

The press, as do the government, parties and general public, recognizes the significance of Austria's political and geographical situation. Austria stands free but vulnerable on the border between two worlds, open to influences and pressures from both. It is a situation calling for a strong and continuing sense of national unity, and to this the press, while politically committed and active, contributes. But there are drawbacks. Continuation of coalition rule may have a logical basis, but the effect on political vitality can be dampening. The necessity of finding a compromise policy between contradictory political viewpoints frequently results in slowness of decision and sometimes in no decision on important issues. There is a certain immobilism in Austrian political life, and the press, in taking such great care not to rock the coalition boat, also contributes to this.

Letter From Africa

The following letter to the editor of this journal is written by a faculty member of the one-year-old Jackson College of Journalism of the University of Nigeria, in Nsukka, East Nigeria. It presents an interesting picture of the new and possibly the only degree-granting school of journalism in West Africa.

Mr. Frederick T. C. Yu, Editor
The Journalism Review
School of Journalism, Montana State University
Missoula, Montana, U. S. A.

Dear Mr. Yu:

Greetings from West Africa!

This brief letter from Nigeria comes to you today both as an introduction to and an appeal from the Staff and students of the Jackson College of Journalism.

The Jackson College of Journalism is an established department of the greater University of Nigeria located here in Nsukka, Eastern Nigeria. Although the University itself is now in its second academic year, the Jackson College of Journalism opened its door officially only last fall. And in doing so, Jackson College became the first and is—at present—the only degree-granting institution of its kind in all West Africa.

In our first year, we already have 17 keen young man majoring in journalism along with three additional students electing courses in the College. In additional to other basic required courses in the University, our first-year majors are taking two courses in journalism, "Introduction to Journalism" and "Basic News Writing and Reporting," Beginning French, Typing and Shorthand. Next year, when we will have both first- and second-year students, we hope to offer 13 courses in the newspaper, magazine and radio-TV sequences. Along with our present Nigerian students, we expect also to have new students from Ghana and Liberia as well.

Jackson College is truly a pioneer venture, and like many other beginning institutions lacking precedents or counterparts, we have gotten underway carefully. Through trial and error we are learning as much as we are teaching.

We began the academic year with a partially completed building, no furniture, no equipment, no textbooks and a non-existent library. And like many other pioneering ventures, we began with limited faculty and finances as well.

We now have some textbooks, but since these are almost entirely from the U.S.A. and U.K.—and since there are no journalism texts written for West Africa as such, use of these books requires some ingenuity and considerable adaption. We now have the rudiments of a small library, thanks to the loaning and sharing of a few books and the giving of periodicals and newspapers by friends of the College locally.

However, as a part of the training programme for our students here, we would like very much to acquaint them not only with newspapers and magazines of general circulation—both here and abroad, but also those publications of a more specialized nature which are published particularly for persons with a professional interest in writing and/or any of the many areas of the mass communications media. In regard to the latter, we admit quite frankly that we have two problems: first of all, no publications of this type—such as your own—are published in Nigeria and, secondly, our fledgling College has no budget, at present, for the purchase of any publications, general or specialized. We are, for the time being at least, dependent for such materials upon the goodwill and the generosity of fellow journalism educators, editors and publishers in other countries.

And so, on behalf of our students and in our desire to make our training programme for them as comprehensive and flexible as possible, we ask if your organization—as a contribution to journalism education in Nigeria and in West Africa—would consider making its publication available to the Jackson College of Journalism. If you would consider adding the name of our institute to your mailing list we would be most grateful.

The inclusion of your publication in our College Library as additional reference material would be invaluable to our students and to us who teach them. In return, we should be happy to share with you our first brief attempt at publishing, a little mimeographed newsletter "for and about journalists in West Africa," which the staff and students of Jackson College of Journalism put out from time to time.

Thanks in advance for any consideration you may be willing to give us in this regard, and our own best wishes to you and your staff.

Yours very sincerely,
Earl O. Roe
Lecturer in Journalism

Report from Helsinki

KEKKONEN AND THE FINNISH PRESS

By *A. E. PEDERSEN, JR.*

A native of Kalispell, Montana, A. E. PEDERSEN, JR. *was graduated from the MSU School of Journalism in 1949. He has been with the United Press, later the United Press International, since 1952. He is now chief of the UPI bureau in Helsinki, a post he has held since 1956. He has covered many important news events for the UPI including the Communist World Youth Festival in Moscow in 1957, the Icelandic-British fishing war of 1958, the second Law-of-the-Sea Conference in Geneva in 1960, the NATO meeting at Oslo in 1961 and the Hammarskjold funeral at Stockholm last September. He accompanied President Kekkonen on his U.S. tour last October.*

By the time that this is printed, Urho Kaleva Kekkonen will probably have been elected to a second six-year term as president of the Finnish republic, with a mandate to continue the foreign policy which he has helped develop. His election does not mean that he is the man whom the Finns really wanted in the presidency. Events of last autumn, when the Soviet Union apparently suspected that Kekkonen and his foreign policy might lose, eliminated Kekkonen's strongest opponent from the field. Thus many of the presidential elector candidates who trooped to the president's colors in January qualified their support with the words, "in view of the present situation."

Urho Kekkonen has not been a popular president. Sensitive to criticism, possessed of a cutting wit, and inclined to lay down the law when he loses patience, he has been the target of a growing resentment over the key position of his old Agrarian party in national affairs. It may be that he had no choice. His first term of office has been marked by years of bitter feuding between rival factions of the Social Democratic party, one of the key parties in Finnish coalition government. It is hard to say just how many of the punitive measures taken against the right-wing Social Democrats were carried out with presidential approval. They could just as easily have come from a small group of young agrarians who have been the driving force in party affairs.

But this period of Socialist split has also been a period of choosing sides, with most center and rightist politicians siding with the right-wing socialist faction, the faction that controlled the party machinery.

The thing that really rankled them was the Agrarian claim that rightist Socialists and their conservative comrades-in-arms had no real faith in the "Paasikivi-Kekkonen line," the form of neutrality that President Juho K. Paasikivi first laid down and which Kekkonen, his successor, embroidered upon. While the Agrarians seldom, if ever, joined in the Communist and leftist Socialist chorus that some right-wingers were downright dangerous to the security of Finland, the president never really attempted to squelch these accusations from the far left.

It was therefore natural that exasperated bourgeois parties joined forces with rightist Socialists in backing Olavi Honka, a respected and recently retired chancellor of justice (state prosecutor), for the presidency. Leaders of the Swedish Peoples party, a center grouping that takes care of the national minority's interests, said early last autumn that most of the party's followers appeared to favor Honka. This was also the situation in liberal and conservative ranks. In fact, probably 40 per cent or more of the various party strength was behind Honka.

KREMLIN WORRIES ABOUT KEKKONEN

Last autumn the Kremlin began to worry about Kekkonen losing the election. There was only an outside chance that this would happen, but the Kremlin was not taking any chances. So while President Kekkonen was winding up a highly successful American tour, the Soviet Union invoked a 1948 treaty that provided for joint defense measures in case "Germany or states allied with her" threaten the peace of the Baltic area.

The request for joint defense talks hit Finland like a bombshell. President Kekkonen, studying the first reports

while sitting under a palm tree on a Hawaiian beach, said, "Let's go swimming." He sent Ahti Karjalainen, his foreign minister and closest confidant, back to Finland while he went through the last few days of his visit.

THE PRESIDENT'S U.S. TOUR

In the last few months, I have heard a number of Finns remark how fortunate it was that the president was able to make an American tour before all the excitement began. I accompanied the party on most of the journey, and I believe that the president did an excellent job telling Americans and Canadians about Finland. The Finns, from the president on down, were not prepared for the welcome they got. "We didn't know we had that much good will in the bank," one member of the party told me.

This welcome was largely an American expression of admiration for Finland. It was, secondly, due to the president's personal charm, personality and intelligence. If there was a slight touch of the "Brave Little Finland" in the welcome, it was understandable. The three-month Winter War of 1939-40 is about the only chapter of Finnish history that is more or less familiar to Americans.

Back in Helsinki, the president and the minority Agrarian government began sounding out the Russians as to their intentions. When Moscow intimated that political assurances of Finnish neutrality would suffice, the president rescheduled the July elections for February, to provide a national vote of confidence in the policy of neutrality and friendship. "This was also to give us time," the president later told a public gathering. By February, he believed, the world situation might have changed sufficiently so that the Russians were no longer interested in joint defense measures.

KEKKONEN MEETS WITH KHRUSHCHEV

When Moscow said that the rescheduled elections were not enough of a guarantee of Finnish neutrality, the president took the unusual but realistic step of asking for a meeting with Soviet Premier Khrushchev.

At Novosibirsk, he got Khrushchev to withdraw the request for joint military talks. Whether the Soviet leader had already made up his mind to go along with what Kekkonen could be expected to suggest may never be known. Persons who attended the three-hour talk said that all appeared to go quite well.

As the two leaders were talking, Honka decided to pull out of the race in the interests of national unity. The Honka front was hardly the unholy alliance that the far left claimed it to be. But it was an unnatural one, lumping Social Democrat, liberal and conservative under one leaky roof. Its unusual character indicates that it was an honest expression of the exasperation that many reasonable politicians felt towards Kekkonen's "father-knows-best" attitude. When Honka withdrew, the Social Democrats put up a moderate socialist, while the center and right decided that Kekkonen was probably the best candidate of the lot, inasmuch as he was the only bourgeois candidate in sight. And if he were going to be elected anyway, it would be better if the center and right were behind him, to avoid Kekkonen's having to rely on Communist votes, as was the case in 1956. The men who had used the strongest terms in criticizing Kekkonen now began to support him, although for many it was a bitter pill to swallow.

THE 'PAASIKIVI-KEKKONEN LINE"

At this point it might be well to take a look at the "Paasikivi-Kekkonen line." First bearing only Paasikivi's name, it was amended—first by the Russians, I believe—about a year ago. In essence, it holds that Finland must never give the Russians cause for suspicion.

Relations must be more than correct and friendly. They must be cordial.

This type of foreign policy necessarily means close, personal contacts between the leading statesmen of the two countries. In this, Kekkonen has been quite successful. There is good reason to believe that Khrushchev actually likes the Finnish president, although they make a strange combination. Kekkonen is a thinker, a political philosopher, as well as practical politician. Khrushchev is brute force equipped with a hearty smile and a cheery manner.

As long as Kekkonen and Khrushchev get along, Finland's foreign policy will be successful. ("And just so the president knows where to draw the line," one critical editor told me.)

THE CRUCIAL QUESTION

But what about the future?

There is in Finland today a personality cult of sorts, as *Helsingin Sanomat,* Finland's largest newspaper, claimed recently. It pictures the president a bit larger than life-sized. Its adherents, mostly zealous young men from the Agrarian party, tend to give the president qualities that few could possess. There is also a tendency to separate the president's supporters into "pre-Honka" and "post-Honka" groups, the inference being that the late arrivals are playing some slightly shady game of their own.

There is, in Finland today, the germ of a situation that could lead to Finnish de gaullism.

"Foreign policy must always take precedence over domestic policy," said Paasikivi. *Uusi Suomi,* leading conservative newspaper, said recently that this meant that "internal disagreements must not interfere with the handling of big, national problems."

Given a certain situation and men with a minimum of scruples, Paasikivi's words could be interpreted as mean-

ing that anything can be justified in the name of foreign policy. A number of the anti-Kekkonen die-hards claim that this has already happened, and that the agrarians have sought support abroad. This is going a bit far. But it would be fair to say that the Agrarians have milked the present situation for all that it is worth.

The president has probably acted quite admirably, in view of the exasperations that he must have felt. While the Agrarians have not been playing a high level of politics, neither have the right-wing Social Democrats passed up any chances to snipe at the president. Vaino Leskinen, vice chairman of the Social Democratic party, is an old political rival of the president. The two are also reported to have developed a deep personal dislike for each other.

THE PRESIDENT AND HIS CRITICS

Under the circumstances, Kekkonen's post-Novosibirsk plea to his hard core of critics to leave the scene gracefully was not unreasonable. There appeared to be a feeling of relief when a number of the more controversial Finns decided to withdraw from politics. *Helsingin Sanomat* also cautioned one conservative who rejected this way of doing business not to act like a "bull in a china shop."

Shortly before the presidential elections, there were indications that the Social Democratic party was moving slowly in the direction of a meeting with its left-wing opposition and also toward a reconciliation with the Agrarians. If so, this will be the best thing that has happened in Finnish politics in years. Responsible majority government would end the temptation of one group or another making use of foreign policy as a weapon with which to knock the other side senseless.

The president's adherents have probably won. The men who refused to accept his leadership appear to be on the way out. But the losers are refusing to surrender unconditionally, and they have insisted on criticizing the president if they believe he deserves it.

Criticism of a Finnish president, by the way, is unusual. But Kekkonen's political activities led the opposition press to ignore this old rule.

POSITION OF THE FINNISH PRESS

Although the office of the president is supposed to be above politics, and therefore above criticism, the Finnish press very definitely has a right to take stands. "Finnish citizens shall enjoy freedom of speech and the right to print and publish written or pictorial representations without interference," according to the constitutional guarantee on press rights.

Finland has, however, often been lumped with those countries where the press is not free. This may stem from a Finnish law which prohibits writings tending to harm Finland's relations with foreign powers. This law, however, has seldom been invoked. It is too strong a weapon and its use could boomerang.

The Finnish press may have little to say about some international problems, although there is a good deal of constructive comment calculated to hurt no feelings.

"Finnish newspapers and periodicals do not indulge in tirades against foreign powers," according to the FINNFACTS *Newsletter,* published by the Central Association of Finnish Wood-Working Industries. "When criticism is called for, it is printed. But on the whole, remarkable restraint is shown . . . . Editors often feel that they are too remote from, say, some trouble spot in Africa to go overboard in editorial admonition."

PRESS STRUCTURE IN FINLAND

Finland has 36 daily newspapers and more than 160 appearing less regularly. Their combined circulation is about two million, quite good for a country of four and a half million population. Of this circulation, about three-fourths is held by daily newspapers.

The press, with a few exceptions, is a party press, and there is no mistaking the affiliation. The leading exception to the rule of party connections is *Helsingin Sanomat,* with 255,000 circulation Finland's largest newspaper. Its nearest competitor has less than half that circulation. *Helsingin Sanomat,* published by Eljas Erkko, who is a past president of the International Press Institute, follows an independent line, but with some conservative overtones.

The Finnish press, which gets most of its news from abroad, depends on Western news agencies. Few newspapers have their own men abroad. It's too expensive. But they have a voracious appetite for news. *Helsingin Sanomat* rarely prints less than eight solid columns of general foreign news on any given day.

"A really striking feature of the Finnish press is the amazing amount of space it devotes to foreign news," said the FINNFACTS *Newsletter.* "No one is more aware than a Finnish editor that what happens out in the world can have a very marked influence on the course of events of his country."

Although television has invaded Finland, with 200,000 sets and a private network competing with the government stations, Finns still look to their newspapers for views and comments. Newspapers regularly reprint one another's editorials. Letter columns are well filled. There is a zest for life among Finland's newspapers, an attitude somewhat similar to that of America's own pioneer press. That is a healthy sign in a country where independence and freedom depend on a friendly foreign policy which, accommodating as it may be, still must draw a line.

Report from Hamburg

IN WEST GERMANY: THE MEDIA ARE UNEASY

By *EHRENFRIED (FRED) KLAUER*

A special student at the MSU School of Journalism under the sponsorship of the U.S. Government in 1951-52, EHRENFRIED KLAUER *now is a staff member of* Die Welt *in Hamburg, Germany. He was born and educated in Berlin, and began his journalistic career in 1947 when he joined the staff of the* Telegraf, *where he handled editing, political reporting and leader writing. He was with the* Telegraf *until April, 1960, when he joined the foreign desk of* Die Welt.

A brief front page dispatch in the last issue for 1961 of a well-known West German newspaper, a turn on the knob of a TV set somewhere between Rhine and Elbe, and discussions about press-hampering procedures—these three features strike the keynote for an analysis of "journalism and politics in West Germany," as viewed from the Federal Republic.

The dispatch concerns the return of a highly respected West German journalist to a newspaper in a position inferior to the job which he had left. The TV screens mean a constant reminder of an unsuccessful attempt by Chancellor Adenauer's government to avail itself of the possibilities for very strong influence in the program. And the inter-job-talking concerns the fears that something of a similar sort might still be in the offing.

All three finally seem to add up to the conclusion that as free as the communications media in West Germany may be, prosperity, self-satisfaction and probably a bit too much political stability create certain checks for journalism which are hard to cope with. Let's examine the three.

THE CASE OF HERR SETHE

In its last issue of the old year *Die Welt,* one of the West German dailies with nationwide appeal, carried an almost casually worded report: "On January 1, 1962, Paul Sethe will return to the editorial staff of *Die Welt.* The journalist known to the German public just as well as to the foreign world will take charge of the department 'Documentation and Contemporary History.'"

Herr Sethe is an excellent writer. To read an article or a book by him is highly rewarding. He is forceful in writing and liberal in thinking. A forum to express his ideas was to be a weekly, similar to one he was to take over after he had left *Die Welt* on March 31, 1960, from a position comparable to an American editor of the editorial page. The new weekly had nothing to do with *Die Welt.* Instead it was to be affiliated with another well-known postwar German publication, the news magazine *Der Spiegel.* This magazine prides itself in taking *Time* as its ideal, although it is politically far more outspoken than Mr. Luce's brainchild. In its political line it claims to be realistic—in particular as far as the East is concerned. To have a highbrow platform for the expression of such realistic ideas—especially in respect to the overwhelming problem of German unification—the management of *Der Spiegel* set out to found this weekly and to ask Herr Sethe to run it.

Now from hindsight it appears obvious that new approaches toward the German problem against the back-

ground of East-West tensions have been made every once in a while by many leading publications in West Germany during the last 10 years. The fruitlessness of such attempts soon became plain. *Die Welt,* for instance, seemed to its readers for some time about five years back to advocate Mr. Kennan's "disengagement theory." But after the lack of inclination in Moscow to eye a solution on some such line, *Die Welt* no longer followed this line.

The weekly Herr Sethe was to run, however, never was born. The project stumbled over a legal enjoinder by the daily *Deutsche Zeitung,* whose publisher felt that the title of the planned project, *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung,* was too similar to his own. This fact is only marginal. It is significant only insofar as *Deutsche Zeitung* to the German public is regarded as supporting big industry and the Adenauer government almost without reserve. *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung,* however, was intended to be exactly the opposite.

The significance of all this was that a truly liberal publication could not appear. It was not suppressed. It was not forbidden. It was killed by a long legal suit. And the implication is that there was no market for a publication looking for a new approach to the burning questions in Central Europe.

After Herr Sethe was left without the hoped-for mouthpiece, he took a kind of journalistic stroll. He expressed some of his views in another weekly, *Die Zeit.* Whatever may have been the final reasons for the publisher of *Die Welt* and Herr Sethe to join hands again—these reasons are too complicated to be analyzed here—the latest episode of this remarkable journalist's career is a good example of a journalistic case-study in a state run by a democratically elected government and addicted to its chancellor's slogan: "No experiments."

THE CASE OF TELEVISION

The above-mentioned example refers to a by-product of a society having rapidly jumped into prosperity. The next one refers to intended influence of the state in the case of television.

Non-private radio—something evoking horror to American minds—for reasons of origin and development has been common in Germany. Public control, with which other countries are familiar, is vested in supervisory bodies of representatives from all walks of life. When TV came into being in West Germany, the publicly controlled radio corporations of the federal states joined to produce a single program. But soon came the cry for variety and diversity in television programs.

In jumped Chancellor Adenauer. By a device of private corporation law and against the advice of even some of his close friends, he tried to secure government influence in the make-up of what came to be called the "second TV program." Criticism came not only from the opposition but also from the political camp loyal to him. In came the constitution.

The supreme constitutional court in Karlsruhe ruled the Adenauer set-up incompatible with the constitution of 1949. It definitely upheld the powers of the federal states in cultural matters, of which the court considered TV to be a part. The result of this struggle was a delay in the preparations for the second program.

If Adenauer had tried patiently to co-operate with the federal states to work out a program, he might have made a great contribution because of the large funds at the disposal of the federal government. But instead he longed for all the power himself and abused the constitution. This is the gist of the court ruling.

THE CASE OF LAW

Finally, there is another judicial and political matter of concern to all journalists. While it is often their job to deal with all kinds of pressure groups, in Germany they form a pressure group themselves. They are trying to thwart federal government plans to introduce a law by which judges can enforce punishments against those who violate what would be called "honor protection" of persons of public interest.

Although government advocates are likely to refer to the Anglo-American libel principle for backing, there is no real parallel. Whereas libel is based on the common law practice, the new West German legal institution would involve a considerable amount of state help by making the matter a public offense.

It all boils down to the danger of the state extending the law to punish persons who have engaged in justified criticism. But the chance for the law to pass is dim indeed. The journalists are keeping a close watch on that.

CONFORMITY AND COMMUNICATIONS

The picture of the West German society today largely shows conformity. This sociological pattern of behavior necessarily affects the communications media.

Increasingly, conformity seems the only answer to Mr. Khrushchev's threats, to the wall in Berlin and to his enforced drive to accept nothing but surrender on Soviet terms. The opposition Social Democrats under Herr Brandt, in a move to throw away their last doctrinaire remnants, have come close to Adenauer, too—and thus are necessarily conforming.

West Germans must realize that the freedom to choose a successful democratic government may mean the freedom to lose variety. To apologists, conformity is the price for stable government; to skeptics, it is stifling.

GREECE:

THE IMAGE AND THE FACT

By *DOROTHY M. JOHNSON*

DOROTHY M. JOHNSON, *a free-lance writer and secretary-manager of Montana State Press Association, joined the MSU journalism staff in 1953 to teach magazine courses. She writes frequently for the nation's leading magazines. The title story of her third book,* The Hanging Tree, *has been made into a movie starring Gary Cooper. A new movie, "The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance," starring John Wayne and James Stewart, is based on a short story by Miss Johnson. One of her western short stories has just been published in Urdu. She is now working on a novel; she also is preparing several articles on modern Greece.*

Last summer I went looking for something I did not really hope to find—the glory of ancient Greece. What I was looking for, a series of images formed by reading, was so magnificent that I almost canceled the whole trip at the last minute. The images were vivid and satisfying; why spoil the dream with the reality?

The images were mostly wrong. Now I treasure both the fiction and the facts. Next time I shall go confidently to the same places and to some new ones.

To the site of ancient Troy I'll take my image of the topless towers in flames, with old Hecuba mourning her dead hero son and the fate of her doomed daughters. They'll be there, whatever else may be. The ruins that Heinrich Schliemann excavated in the nineteenth century will reinforce, not erase, the Troy that Homer and Euripides built for me.

The first Greeks I ever saw were swarthy, fierce-mustached men who worked at repairing railroad track for the Great Northern near Rainbow Falls, Montana, when I was six years old. They were much talked about in our tiny community because they spoke no English, kept to themselves, and sometimes had uproarious fights.

These Greeks did not at all match my later college concept of Greeks as bald, bearded philosophers loosely draped in white bed sheets. When I was six, the Greek section hands were simply foreign and incomprehensible. Now I know that they were bolder adventurers than Odysseus. They had traveled seven thousand miles. He drifted only a few hundred and was royally entertained. I wonder if, when they got home, they told their wives such unlikely stories as he did.

THE HALLOWED ACADEMY

No philosophers, bearded or otherwise, were around when I plucked a fragrant red flower in the hallowed Academy, the grove where Socrates and Plato once walked together. The Academy was, historically, a garden named for a former owner, Academus. But my image of Plato's Academy unfortunately continues to be a run-down public-school building that can't be replaced because the taxpayers voted down a bond issue. The real, present-day Academy (which a guide kindly explained didn't have the same trees in 1961 as in the fifth century B.C.) was cluttered with paper napkins and empty ice-cream cartons dropped by nonclassical Greek litterbugs.

Homer's "wine-dark sea"—now there's an image for you. I traveled on the Aegean for five days, and it was never anything but a normal salt-water blue with gray islands in it. Islands should, of course, be green. A cranky old Irishman on the cruise ship complained bitterly to the tour guide because they weren't.

Homer was not a fanciful poet. Anyway Schliemann

found Troy right where Homer said it was. Probably Homer *had* looked upon wine when it was blue, or on the Aegean when it was red. He had more experience with both than I've had. (All the Greek wine *I* saw was pale yellow.) I keep his Aegean and mine in separate compartments in my image cupboard.

On his wine-dark sea the Argonauts still set forth to find the Golden Fleece; and a black-sailed ship is still bringing Theseus home after he killed the Minotaur in the labyrinth on Crete; and the "wooden walls" of Athens—the historic fleet that defeated the Persians at Salamis—come sailing home, victorious.

On my blue sea there is a rattly little cruise ship that, when she was younger, used to ply out of Vancouver, B.C. She isn't very romantic, but the passengers don't have to row.

MYTHS AND IMAGES

My earliest introduction to ancient Greece came from a book of Greek myths (suitably bowdlerized for the young) that I read at the age of ten. One story was about a girl (about my age, I thought) who was kidnapped by a bad man driving a team of black horses. Her mother made him give her back, but the little girl ate the seeds of a pomegranate although she had been warned not to, so she had to go back to the bad man's house for three months every year and that's why we have winter.

That was the image—an elevating story with two morals: your mother will always look out for you, but you get punished for breaking rules, even if they're silly.

Later study has superimposed a new, fearsome image on that one. Dread Persephone, awful Persephone, the ancient Greeks called that girl. She was Kore, the maiden, the unwilling bride of Death. Her mother was great Demeter, goddess of fertility and growth, whose maternal mourning caused starvation among mankind. They were chthonian deities, not Olympian; they belonged to the dark terrors beneath the earth, not to the radiance of mountain peaks.

Demeter was worshipped at Eleusis, a few miles from Athens, in rites so secret that to this day nobody knows what they were, although thousands of people took prayerful part in the Eleusinian Mysteries. What I mistook for remarkably well preserved Doric columns at Eleusis were really the smokestacks of a cement plant, but this disclosure did not spoil my image of devout worshippers of Demeter learning from the Mysteries something that made their lives easier to endure.

'NEVER ON SUNDAY'

The music of ancient Greece remains a dim auditory image, lyres and small drums and piping flutes. Those sounds unheard are sweeter than the contemporary fiddles and bagpipes of gaily costumed folk dancers or the theme song of "Never on Sunday," dear to every Greek orchestra on land or sea. The Greeks are proud of that movie, made in Athens' port city, Piraeus. It is good drama, but Aeschylus is still way out in front.

Some of my images came from pictures. There was Hermes, with wings on his hat and heels, an early-day Western Union boy in undress summer uniform, flitting around on errands for Zeus. Now I know that he had a more solemn duty. He was Psychopompos, who escorted the soul of the dead to the underworld.

There was another image: a cold marble statue named Apollo, an overrated pretty boy. He had a twin sister, Artemis, who wore a short skirt and ran around in the woods with a bow and arrow—the tomboy type.

These were the most outrageously distorted images of all. I spent 24 hours on Parnassus, Apollo's mountain, and I think he is still there, forever asleep—not dead, because gods cannot die, but starved and powerless because for 1600 years he has received no sacrifices.

Next summer I intend to visit the ruins of Ephesus, in Turkey, where there was once a temple to Artemis that was one of the Seven Wonders of the World, but I shall not stay long. Artemis scares me. That tomboy killed people for no reason except that she was offended, and she was a *very* sensitive girl.

APOLLO'S ORACLE

But Delphi, on Parnassus, where Apollo's oracle answered questions for kings and commoners during a thousand years of recorded history—there I must stay for several days and think about some things.

I went there with the conviction that a lot of people must have been pretty naive if they believed that Apollo really answered them through his priestess. *We* don't take much stock in fortune tellers. *We* don't go to church with the confident belief that we can ask questions and receive answers, in words, directly from God. But the ancient Greeks did, and so did many barbarians, non-Greeks. Croesus, powerful king of Lydia, believed it, and so did a long line of Roman emperors.

The ancients had dozens of sacred places where a troubled man could go to ask for divine guidance. He spoke to a god, and the god answered. Communication was better in those days than it is now. In a grove at Dodona, Zeus answered with the rustling of oak leaves. But most famous of all the oracles was the one at Delphi, where a woman spoke for Apollo.

The trouble was that Apollo's answers were ambiguous. The oracle gave this message to the King of Lydia, who contemplated the expansion of his holdings: "If Croesus

crosses the Halys, a great empire will be lost." The trusting Croesus, whose immensely rich gifts to Apollo at Delphi are a matter of historic record, confidently crossed the Halys River—but it was his empire that was lost. The oracle was never wrong, but mere humans beings, alas, sometimes misinterpreted Apollo's answers.

Modern scholars say that the oracle did not, as legend tells us, breathe intoxicating fumes from a fissure in the earth, because the geology there never permitted such a phenomenon. They say she could not have been helped into her mystic trance by chewing laurel leaves, because some learned professor chewed laurel leaves as an experiment, and *he* didn't go into trance.

But the disillusioned scholars can't disillusion *me.* I had the image of the inspired oracle before I climbed into her nook among the tumbled rocks of the temple, and I still have it. Not all the facts lined up by all the scientists can blot it out.

The great Apollo is still there somewhere, although his oracle last spoke in A.D. 363. The Roman emperor Julian, whom the Christians called the Apostate because he earnestly tried to restore the ancient religion, sent a famous doctor, Oribasius, to Delphi. He took back the sad message: "Tell the king the fair-wrought hall has fallen to the ground. No longer has Phoebus a hut, nor a prophetic laurel, nor a spring that speaks. The water of speech even is quenched."

I intend to drink again from the water of speech, the Castalian Spring. It is not quenched, although it no longer echoes to the voice of Phoebus Apollo in his temple a quarter of a mile away. I intend to sit in the ruins of the sanctuary and think about far-shooting Apollo, lord of the silver bow, the god of light and reason and moderation, who killed the Python that represented evil and darkness and, having undergone purification for that blood guilt, was able to purify guilty men.

I shall think about the mottoes that ancient writers tell us were carved there:

KNOW THYSELF

NOTHING IN EXCESS

SHUN PRIDE

I shall look down past the Sacred Way and past the tourist buses to the valley filled with olive groves and watch for the processions of pious pilgrims who, long ago, came slowly up from the port of Itea on the Gulf of Corinth with offerings for Apollo, and questions to ask, during the centuries before communication broke down.

A New World-Wide Dimension

Those who go into the mass communication industries should go in with some equipment of history, some equipment of philosophy, and above all a deep and sensitive awareness of other parts of the world. A new world-wide dimension has been added to what we have to know. But we shall never acquire it unless those whose job it is to inform us are prepared to do the hard, devoted job of acquiring the necessary background. Anyone aiming at journalism today should, for instance, have read enough of Chinese and Indian history to have some sense of why Asia is what it is, and why the reactions are what they are. I defy anybody to understand what is going on in China now if he knows nothing about the history of the last hundred years, since so many of China's responses are profoundly conditioned by what happened in the 19th century encounter between China and the West.

The need is no less in other societies. The whole world has been drawn into a single scientific and technological society by Western action. We are all neighbors, we all sit on each other's doorsteps, and we have a direct responsibility to inform ourselves both about the impact of what we in the West have done and about the consequences for all of us of the vast changes we have wrought in human society. Perhaps of all things that I would wish for you in a school of journalism is that you should never regard your work as only day-to-day reporting, because day-to-day reporting can be like a fevered dream if it is not linked solidly with the facts of history, of social change, of economic transformation. The more your reporting is given in depth, the more the people you are informing will display the kind of public opinion that can support leadership in a time of crisis and has the vigor and confidence to go forward with the revolutionary changes in policy which our times demand.

—Excerpts of the John F. Murray lecture delivered by Barbara Ward, Lady Jackson, British Author and Lecturer, at the State University of Iowa, April, 1961.

Report from Buenos Aires

PRESS AND POLITICS IN ARGENTINA

By *JUDITH BLAKELY*

A few months after graduation from the MSU School of Journalism in 1960, JUDITH BLAKELY *went to Argentina where she studied for a year under an Inter-American Press Association scholarship. She returned from Buenos Aires early this year and is now on the news staff of the* Tulsa World *in Oklahoma.*

Only seven years ago armed guards patrolled the subway stations of Buenos Aires. Women were afraid to wear hats—a status symbol—on the streets. The influential *La Prensa* had been taken over and spoke only as a ventriloquist's dummy using the words of the dictator, Juan Domingo Peron.

Freedom was non-existent in Argentian under Peron. It was not restored until he was ousted.

It is both significant and gratifying to note that at the meeting of the Inter-American Press Association in New York City last October, Argentina was listed on the positive side by the Freedom of the Press committee which had studied the existing situation in each Latin nation.

These newspaper statistics[1] are revealing:

Country	*Dailies*	*Circulation*	*Population*
Argentina	128	3,247,004	20,956,000
Total of the 20 South and Central American lands	862	13,760,912	198,344,000
United States	1763	58,881,746	180,529,000

Argentina has 155 newspaper copies per 1,000 inhabitants; the U.S. has 326. Only Uruguay of the 20 Latin American members of the Organization of American States tops Argentina in printed issues per thousand.

[1]Number of newspapers and circulation figures are from the *1960 International Year Book of the Editor and Publisher.* Population figures are from the *Statistical Bulletin of the United Nations.*

In the "Capital Federal," Buenos Aires, newspapers are published for every political or language preference.

LA PRENSA AND LA NACION

La Prensa, the traditional Paz family newspaper, and *La Nacion,* its Mitre family competitor, are the two principal morning dailies. Both papers place great emphasis on international news and feature an essay style in their special articles. *La Prensa,* the older of the two, was the first to strike gold with classified advertisements and leads in advertising space, revenue and circulation.

Latin newspapers in general are more literary and longwinded than their North American counterparts. They are not disciples of the "terse, tight, telegraphic" theory.

When "Che" Guevara's mother was leading riots in the Law School of the University of Buenos Aires this year, one had to read 50 inches into the newspaper report to learn what she had done. Typically, the occurrence was related chronologically and one had to delve past reams of descriptive prose to get to the point of the article.

A "who, what, when, etc." lead is rare. Timeliness often becomes timelessness.

An editor of the *Buenos Aires Herald,* the English-language daily, told me of a not uncommon press decision which occurred at the time of the 1955 revolution.

Airplanes had attacked the Casa Rosada (the Argentine White House) before dawn and some morning newspapers stopped the presses to announce the welcome news.

One large daily, however, already had an editorial on the year's olive crop set in type. Although the paper did

alter the headline to make room for the revolution, editorial opinion did not appear until the following issue.

OTHER IMPORTANT PAPERS

In addition to *La Prensa* and *La Nacion,* the major morning newspapers are the tabloid-sized *Clarin,* which has the largest morning circulation, and *El Mundo.*

In the evening the *Portenos,* as the people of that port city call themselves, have *La Razon, Correo de la Tarde, Critica* and *Noticias Graficas* as their principal dailies.

La Razon claims the highest circulation of any Spanish language newspaper in the world. It is the most sensational of the big Buenos Aires dailies; it features scandals, murders, sex and Cuba in great detail in every issue. The sensational slant of *La Razon* is calm, however, compared to an assortment of weekly magazines.

With a circulation of 400,000, *La Razon* has a daily front-page habit which almost drives U.S. readers mad.

Instead of changing a story when additions or corrections come in over the wire service, the editors merely add the latest story to the ones already in type. Thus one usually finds as many as eight stories grouped together and datelined Cuba, for example, each with one new fact or contradiction of preceding material.

In 1958 a two-page news sheet appeared in Buenos Aires. *Correo de la Tarde* grew to a thin daily and then to a bulky tabloid. It then changed to standard format and has made its mark among the leading newspapers of the capital. This daily sports the most attractive, appealing front page in Buenos Aires. The clean, striking makeup is enhanced by few but large photographs, bold headlines and relatively concise writing. The editorials are accurate, timely and to the point.

Besides these eight major and many lesser Spanish language dailies, newspapers in some 30 other languages including English, French, German, Italian, Arabic, Yiddish, Russian, Japanese, Polish and Lebanese are published in Buenos Aires. Only New York City exceeds the Argentine capital in this linguistic array.

Many of the approximately 18 political parties in Argentina have their own printed voice. Political parties are constantly shifting and splitting in Argentina. But the newspapers and magazines, like the parties, exist from right of right to left of left.

La Hora, the Communist newspaper, was closed by the government in 1955. There are no Socialist dailies. Yet the far-left weeklies receive much support from publications in neighboring Uruguay and Chile. These publications are sold on the streets of Buenos Aires.

North American newspapers often die as a result of competition, cost, lack of advertising, thinning market or change of reading tastes. In Latin America, however, newspapers are temporarily felled or permanently silenced by totalitarian governments, lesser dictators, student riots, extreme nationalists or military pressure. The battle for newspaper freedom in Latin America goes on year in, year out.

But 1962 may be the best year for freedom of the press in Latin America in decades.

"With the great exception of Cuba, where the bloody tyranny of Fidel Castro has demolished completely the free press, and the minor exceptions in the Dominican Republic, Paraguay and Haiti, journalism is enjoying maximum liberty. Its intellectual level goes forward in constant improvement and its positive influence makes itself felt with great force." This was the observation of *Vision* magazine after the semi-annual Inter-American Press Association session in October, 1961. The IAPA is a sounding board where newspapermen from all over the Americas unite in their studies and in their appeals for press freedom.

ARGENTINE COMMUNICATION BEHAVIOR

In Argentina reading the news and "talking politics" are dynamic, active habits.

Blocking sidewalks and streets in front of the shop windows of the large newspaper offices is a favorite pastime in Buenos Aires. Pedestrians crowd around the newspaper buildings where the latest news bulletins are posted. These complete strangers stand and read, smoke and comment. The mass of upturned, scanning eyes breaks up into smaller circles and the discussions and arguments start.

The men making the news could not be more dedicated or determined than these headline re-hashers found on the Buenos Aires streets at any time of day. It is a custom to offer comment on each news item whether or not the passerby has any additional information or background on the story. This creative game which resembles a more active, gesticulative, outdoor form of the Franch salon usually ends up with the inevitable cup of coffee in a nearby bar.

Definite political beliefs are formulated by the Argentines at an early age. Because of oral final examinations in the universities, the average Argentine is also more than capable of expressing himself—and loves to do so. The Argentine student, who is much more serious than his counterpart in the United States, is busy choosing a political party, not a fraternity.

The opinions and actions of university students have always had a position of great respect and power in Argentine life. Monuments may be seen all over the continent in memory of students who died fighting the government, military or whatever group they felt was abusing their country.

HOW ASIANS SEE INDIA

By *FREDERICK T. C. YU*

DR. FREDERICK T. C. YU, *editor of this journal, has been on the MSU journalism staff since 1955. He received his Ph.D. in mass communications from the State University of Iowa and spent one year as a Ford Foundation Postdoctoral Fellow at Harvard University and the M.I.T. Center for International Studies. He has taught at the University of Southern California, State University of Iowa and Stetson University. He has worked on the World Desk of the* Washington Post and Times Herald *and on the copy desk of the* Springfield (Ohio) News-Sun.

It has become trite to say that India plays a uniquely important rule in Asian politics, that she is a kind of meeting ground between the East and West, that she must be the key test in the wide-ranging struggle between democracy and communism and that she may well hold the balance for the future of Asia. Such views may be entirely correct; they are at least justifiable. But behind such beliefs lurks the suggestion that Indian leadership of the Asian countries is inevitable, desirable or simply to be assumed. What is somehow overlooked is the possibility that such views, while they probably reflect the current political thinking of the West, may not coincide with either the actual attitudes of Asian countries or the harsh actualities of the complicated Asian political scene.

One question of crucial importance immediately presents itself: What attitudes and feelings do Asian nations have toward India?

This is one of the many questions which the writer seeks to answer in connection with an international communications research propect[1] which took him recently to Japan, Korea, South Vietnam, The Philippines, Thailand, Burma and India. The project is designed to examine some of the underpinnings of current Asian thinking about Asian politics, problems and relations. More specifically, it is an exploration of the minds of approximately 150 mass communications leaders and other influential persons in these countries on their mutual images and perceptions of each other and their views of Chinese Communism in particular.

This article will not attempt to analyze all the ideas, attitudes and feelings the above-mentioned Asian countries have toward India. It seeks only to set forth some thoughts on Asian understanding or misunderstanding of India by examining a few sets of sharp Asian images that have turned up in this phase of the inquiry.

THE 'PROBLEM' IMAGE

A generalization can be made about one set of images receiving the heaviest count. An image can be employed to explain the images.

All images, as we know, are infinitely simpler than reality. Consider, for instance, how one writer simplifies when he writes: "Switzerland and Belgium are in the true sense of the word countries. Britain is a tradition. Russia

[1]The project was made possible by a grant from the Ford Foundation, which the writer wishes gratefully to acknowledge. He wishes further to state that all conclusions are strictly his own and do not in any way reflect those of the administration or personnel of the Ford Foundation.

is a mood. America is a way of life. Japan is a spirit, insular and protesting."[2]

India, if it is so simplified, would then be a problem. At least this is what is suggested by the largest number of images uncovered.

In fact, many of the informants in this study could think only of problems when they were asked, among other questions, "What comes to your mind, when you think of India?" Among some of the most frequently mentioned problems: over-population, illiteracy, caste system, untouchability, starvation, child marriages, superstition, backwardness, poverty, etc.

A much larger number of informants came up with vivid visual images and the overwhelming majority of these suggest only more colorfully similar problems. To list just a few:

> fabulous Maharajahs, religious fanatics, cows roaming on streets, cow-dung huts, sidewalk dwellers in Calcutta, people who eat, sleep and die on streets, naked Sadhus, beggars, refugees, shrewd money-lenders, snake-charmers, oppressive heat, swarms of people on streets, hungry faces, swarming millions.

Also large in number are images that suggest problems of a strictly political nature. A good many of these have to do with India's pronounced policy to be neutral (more criticisms than praises), her role in the United Nations (again generally critical rather than complimentary), and her dealings with Communism, particularly Chinese Communism (neither understanding nor sympathy is very much in evidence here).

TWO IMPORTANT IMAGE-MAKERS

Understandably, most of the political images are evoked by India's two most important image-makers: Pandit Nehru and V. K. Krishna Menon. Nehru definitely is a popular and respected leader in the eyes of the majority of the informants. But less than half of them, including many of those who think quite highly of the Prime Minister, like or want to see him as the "spokesman for Asia," and the number of Nehru's critics is by no means negligible. Nehru is regarded as "the greatest living Asian," "a great statesman," "a man who is genuinely interested in peace," etc. He is also condemned as "an opportunist," "foxy," "a man whose only talent is to talk," a man "who talks out of both sides of his mouth," "the typical kind of Indian whom you can't trust," etc.

Menon fares infinitely worse than Nehru among the informants. Only a few of them indicate some admiration for his ability as "a statesman" and for his "brilliant performance" at the United Nations. Most images of him are unfavorable. A few such examples: "a disgusting Communist," "a typical example of those captivated by Marxism," "he speaks very good English—that's all," "even Indians don't care about him."

IMAGES OF INDIANS

The Asian images of the Indian people include, of course, familiar national stereotypes which are probably too well known to warrant any discussion here. Naturally each Asian group tends to associate Indians with those particular Indians with whom it has some contact. As a result we have such familiar Thai images as "big, hefty and bearded Indians" ("good for watchmen," one says); Vietnamese images of the "shrewd money-lenders" in Saigon; and the conflicting Burmese images of "sophisticated," "brilliant but arrogant" Indian scholars, officials, and doctors; and "dirty," "dark-skinned" and "hard-working" coolies and traders in Rangoon.

It is perhaps significant to note that about half of the informants in this study have visited India, that a large number of them have had reasonably intimate knowledge of educated Indians and that quite a few remember Indians in terms of their acquaintances in American or European universities, international conferences or various other gatherings.

Very few of these images or stereotypes suggest much Asian respect or affection for Indians. In fact, a good many informants went much further than just caricaturing the Indians; they volunteered such strong, crude judgment statements as "I don't like Indians" or "I don't care for Indians."

SOME EXAMPLES

Here are some of the examples of unfavorable Asian images of Indians:

A Filipino: "Indians are crafty and have a superiority or inferiority complex. They look down on fellow Asians. They think they are like the whites, except that they have brown skin. When it comes to tricks in business, even the Chinese are no equal."

Another Filipino: "I don't like to say this—and I shouldn't—but I do have some strong prejudices against Indians. Most of them I met abroad are obnoxious. They are arrogant and have a superiority complex. They think they have the best culture in the world."

A Thai: "Very few people in Thailand like Indians. They're stingy. Generally, when the Indians make one dollar, they spend only five cents here. They're not like the Chinese who make their money here, but who spend a lot of their money here. I have pity for Indians. They're selfish. They talk about being religious people, but their religion hasn't done much good to them. There are so many

[2]Frank Gibney, *Five Gentlemen of Japan, The Portrait of a Nation's Character* (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1959), p. 3.

poor Indians. But the rich Indians never help their poor brothers. They just grow richer . . . ."

Another Thai: "Indians are changeable and selfish. I gathered this from what I've read in books and also by observing India's behavior in world affairs . . . India is like people who put two hands in two baskets and try to get things out . . . ."

A Japanese: "I just don't like them. They always feel they are better than other Asians."

A Burmese: "While the British held us down, the Indians went through our pockets."

Another Burmese: "Burmese don't really resent exploitation . . . They resent people who take money out after exploitation . . . The Indians spend perhaps 10 per cent of their earned money here but 90 per cent in India. Their house is forever Indian. They stick together and they don't mix . . . Personally, I regard India as an important Asian country with a common tradition of tutelage. Indian leadership is oriented in the democratic way and India needs encouragement. This may be a rationalization, however. I have no Indian friends and I don't like them."

A Korean: "I have had rather bad impressions about Indians. I met quite a few of them in the United States. They're wise guys. They are arrogant, talkative and not always very pleasant. You just talk with an Indian for five minutes and he is going to give you a lecture on some phases of the greatness of India, or just how great Nehru is."

COLOR PREJUDICES

These are typical comments. Another observation, and a disturbing one, can be made as a result: It is perhaps both unfortunate and ironic that while Asians so often accuse the West of being racially prejudiced, they appear to be victims of rather strong color biases. Isaacs, in his brilliant study of American images of Chinese and Indians, brings up the matter of the Kipling image of the "lesser breed" and the sensitive matter of "dark-skinned" Indians.[3] But Isaacs' informants were not really "crude" when they mentioned color directly as an Indian attribute, and two of them even talked "admiringly" about "dark-skinned" Indians. Not one informant in this study makes any reference to the "dark-skinned Indians" in any favorable manner. Quite a few informants actually are rude on such racial matters. Consider just a few examples:

> I've nothing against Indians as a race . . . Ever since I was a child, I was told that Indians are foreigners. They have dark skin, something like a devil. Our parents used to use Indians to frighten us kids.
>
> Japanese largely despise Indians. They're less advanced. They are inferior. They're so dark.
>
> I find it hard to like dark persons and Indians are so dark.
>
> We Thais are racially Chinese, but culturally Indian . . . We feel much closer to Chinese. We quarrel with the Chinese like members in a family. But Indians, because of their color, are foreigners and we treat them as foreigners.

The number of such remarks, it must be noted, is signicifantly but not alarmingly large (approximately 16 per cent of some 100 interviews). Some attitudes on racial matters, of course, are not as explicitly expressed as they are in the above quotations. Moreover, since all the informants are well educated and among some of the most sophisticated intellectuals in Asia, it is only natural that they would not express as violent racial prejudices as many of their uneducated co-citizens. Nevertheless, some are strongly color-minded and find it difficult to refrain from making pointed observations.

FAVORABLE IMAGES OF INDIA

If the above should suggest that Indians are very much disliked by their fellow Asians, let me hasten to add that favorable images of India are not totally absent. For instance, the Asian image of Gandhi is overwhelmingly favorable and the number of commendatory comments on Indian intellectuals is impressively large. To quote a Philippine journalist: "I have nothing but admiration for India's intellectuals. They seem to be more serious than we Filipinos. They are so eloquent with their questions (at international conferences) that I sometimes feel apologetic about some of our stupid answers."

Another Filipino (a professor and writer) says: "India's leaders are leaders . . . Nehru is a person whom all persons can be proud of. We send our best diplomats to the United States and Europe and only our worst to some of the Asian countries . . . Heaven knows what they think of our intellectuals."

It is true that such favorable Asian images of India are far outnumbered by unfavorable ones. But one should not then immediately conclude that Indians are therefore either disliked or hated in Asia. Images, as noted earlier, are always infinitely less complicated than reality, and images of foreigners frequently are not complimentary or flattering. This is perhaps because, as some scholars have noted, "the foreigner is always caricatured, no matter how friendly the relations with him may be."[4]

These images, while they might irritate and disturb Indians, are perhaps even more astonishing to friends of India in the West. Pandit Nehru is at least familiar

[3]Harold R. Isaacs, *Scratches on our Minds* (New York, The John Day Co., 1958), pp. 281-290.

[4]Ithiel de Sola Pool and Kali Prasad, "Indian Student Images of Foreign People," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* Fall, 1958, p. 293.

with some of these images and it must have pained him when he wrote in his *Discovery of India*:

> To know and understand India, one has to travel far in time and space, to forget for a while her present condition with all its misery and narrowness and horror, and to have glimpses of what she was and what she did, one has not only to go back in time but to travel in mind, if not in body, to various countries of Asia, where India spread out in many ways, leaving immortal testimony of her spirit, her power, and her love of beauty. How few of us know of these great achievements of our past, how few realize that if India was great in thought and philosophy, she was equally great in action. The history that men and women from India made far from their homeland has still to be written. Most westerners still imagine that ancient history is largely concerned with the Mediterranean countries, and medieval and modern history is dominated by the quarrelsome little continent of Europe. And still they make plans for the future as if Europe only counted and the rest could be fitted in anywhere.

Unhappily, the images of India that would naturally sadden Nehru seem to be the sharpest ones in the minds of some of Asia's top intellectual leaders. Apparently very few of them try to understand India in the way advised by Nehru and perhaps even fewer can forget, even for a moment, what Nehru would like them to forget, *i.e.,* "her present condition with all its misery and narrowness and horror."

MEANING OF IMAGES

What does all this mean? The answer: a lot or very little. For it depends largely upon one's appraisal of the role of national images in international affairs. One may want to agree with Elizabeth Todd who observes:

> Nations' images of one another are unquestionably a factor in their relationships. Even though they do not, in themselves, change the course of events, they may strengthen a course determined by other causes; certainly they may be deliberately played upon for that purpose, and sometimes in vicious manipulation.[5]

It is perhaps significant to note that this very problem of images of India has already caught the attention of some educated Indians. One Indian writer in a recent article in the *United Asia,* an important publication in India, urges his government to pay serious attention to the task of projecting a favorable image of his country abroad. He argues:

> . . . what kind of picture should we project abroad of India? The question is not rhetorical, nor merely intended as a parlour game. Should we project an India of Community Projects, of new steel works, of the Bhakra-Nangal dam, of military prowess, of non-violence? In the past the tendency has been to talk of India in terms of set cliches, of an India walking in the footsteps of Mahatma Gandhi, of a neutral India standing aloof from the struggles of the world or of an India willing to be a mediator. A cliche is a good phrase that has outlived its purpose and cliche-images, similarly, are good images that have outlived their usefulness. What one wants to know is whether there is a central agency in New Delhi that consciously tries to conjure up images and worries what shape they should take. We may not admire Madison Avenue techniques, but if we are to function in a world that is conditioned by those techniques, we have to give them thought.[6]

[5]Frank M. Joseph (ed.), *As Others See Us,* Princeton University Press, 1959, p. 355.

[6]"Sounds and Images," *United Asia,* International Magazine of Afro-Asian Affairs, Bombay, India, January, 1962, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 60.

Report on the Thai Press

IN BANGKOK: THE ANTENNAE ARE UP

By *NATHAN B. BLUMBERG*

During the course of an assignment as an American Specialist for the Department of State in Thailand last summer, DEAN NATHAN B. BLUMBERG *talked with hundreds of Thais, including leaders of government, education and the press in Bangkok and Northern Thailand.*

Pone Kingpetch is a handsome young man who does his best when he weights 111½ pounds, give or take a few ounces. As the flyweight boxing champion of the world, he is a national idol in his native Thailand. One day last summer he stood in Bangkok's beautiful Don Muang airport talking with reporters who pressed him for details of his magnificent 15-round decision over challenger Mitsunori Seki in Tokyo. Suddenly a beautiful black-haired girl, a student at Thammasat University in Bangkok (and a budding movie actress), came forward (or was pushed forward by her press agents) and planted a kiss on the cheek (or on the corner of the lips) of the startled boxer. In Thailand one doesn't kiss another in public. The flashbulbs, prudently ready, popped. That afternoon and for the following few days, the front pages of newspapers in Thailand were filled with the running account of the young boxer and the young student (and budding actress).

●

Chulalongkorn University is Thailand's oldest and most conservative university. One day last summer it was observing Wan Khru, *an annual ceremony in which students pay their respects to their teachers. While the members of the faculty sat in the auditorium, a group of political science students gathered outside and began fighting with a number of engineering students. The battle began with fists, but apparently had been well-planned; within minutes both sides were employing stones, bricks, knives and other weapons. Before the hastily summoned police could get matters under control, several students were seriously injured. The following day Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat ordered those students who were not in the hospital to report for a convocation, in which he lectured them for almost two hours on their behavior. Not a word about the riot or the prime minister's speech appeared in the newspapers of Thailand.*

These two events sum up much of what is wrong with the Thai press. Extreme sensationalism and government censorship are two of the major difficulties remaining in newspapers which in the past few years have overcome many other major difficulties.

Bangkok has 14 daily newspapers in the Thai language, ranging from the respected *Siam Rath* and *Siam Nikorn* to a stable of tawdry sheets which specialize in scandal and sports of all kinds. Four daily Chinese-language newspapers cater to the interests of one of the largest overseas Chinese colonies in the world, estimated at almost four million. In addition, two highly competitive dailies are published in English.[1]

No clatter of type-setting machines greets a visitor to any of the daily newspaper plants in Thailand. All of these papers are handset. After they are printed (two or four pages "up" on ancient presses in most cases), they

[1]For an excellent summary of the Thai press, see Albert G. Pickerell, "The Press of Thailand: Conditions and Trends," *Journalism Quarterly,* Winter, 1960, pp. 83-96. Most of what he wrote still applied two years later.

are gathered and folded by hand. They constitute a daily miracle.

Take, for example, the publishing establishment of the *Bangkok World,* the American-style daily paper published by Darrell Berrigan. The *World* runs from eight to 16 standard-sized pages daily and about 32 pages on Sundays. Type is being set by hand or being redistributed into the type cases almost every hour of the day. The typesetting is done by a crew of about 20, mostly young Thai women. They set a paragraph at a time and bring it to a central bank where it is assembled along with other paragraphs into stories. Few of the typesetters can read English, yet their fingers move with amazing nimbleness and they rarely make mistakes. When they do make an error it can be a whopping, and sometimes embarrassing, one. It is all part of the paper's charm.

The first daily newspaper outside Bangkok was started July 1, 1961, in Chiengmai, a city of 50,000 nestled in a lovely valley in Northern Thailand. *Kon Muang (People of the North)* seems to be well established as a daily newspaper, and the quality of its personnel is excellent. The publisher, the editor and the business manager speak English fluently, have studied in American universities, and are journalists of the highest order. The printing plant, one of the best in Thailand, is clean and relatively modern.

OFFSET PROCESS MADE TO ORDER

Obviously, Thailand is ripe for the offset printing process, which is made to order for a country which does not have a single type-setting machine. Thai-language electric typewriters and other typing machines for the offset process are now available and several publishers are considering abandoning letterpress for the newer method.

Thailand also is served by more than a score of "weekly" newspapers, most of them outside Bangkok. The word is put in inverted commas because the papers actually are published every five days to coincide with the official release of winning numbers in the national lottery. Gambling is a national pastime, and a high percentage of Thais participate in the lottery. Circulation of the "weeklies," as a result, is based heavily on interest in certain combinations of numerals, a condition which does not lend itself to the highest standards of journalism. Yet a surprisingly large number of editors and publishers of the "weeklies" deplore the lottery and wish they could be freed from this taint on their efforts.

Bangkok has innumerable radio stations, which pop on and off the air, and two television stations. A large number of magazines also are available. Nonetheless, Thailand has been adjudged by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization as "under developed in information media."

Limiting the effectiveness of the Thai press is the habit of readers of "passing along" newspapers. One purchased newspaper may be read by ten, or a score, or even hundreds of Thais. I sat in a coffee shop in Phitsanulok and watched six men read a newspaper which was two weeks old. An elevator boy I came to know well in the Royal Hotel in Bangkok appeared to believe that newspapers, like wine, improved with age. He seemed to be especially fond of papers which were four or five months old. He would take these papers home to be read by members of his family, and no doubt the yellowing pages were later passed along to friends. This widely prevalent reading habit minimizes the importance of late news and leads to a lackadaisical approach to news stories on almost all of the Bangkok dailies. Needless to add, the practice also cuts down on circulation.

MESSAGES SENT AND RECEIVED

Relations between press and government provide a curious example of traditional Thai adaptability. The nation is governed by a dictator—albeit a benevolent one—and Prime Minister Sarit is a no-nonsense man dedicated to the primary mission of preserving Thai independence in the face of a formidable Communist threat, both internal and external. He did not hesitate to suppress several Chinese-language dailies when they conformed too persistently to the Communist line, and every Thai journalist, from reporter to publisher, is conscious of a line he cannot step over. This line has never been drawn on paper, but it exists. The government has its antennae up to receive sound waves from the press. Each editor, in turn, has his own carefully attuned antenna to catch any change in the message from Government House.

Surprisingly, from an Occidental standpoint, the system works without appreciable difficulty. The newspaper may be critical—but not too critical. The newspaper may report any event—except when it is clear that the government distinctly does not want an event reported. The newspaper is free—within the limits of ideology and what the government regards as national security.

How unrestricted some newspapermen feel about these limitations was shown by the reaction of a distinguished columnist to my questions about "freedom of the press." He pointed out that he had written a column several days after the Chulalongkorn student riot deploring the fact that the police had "suggested" that the story not be run in the newspaper.

"I never heard a word of objection from the government," he concluded triumphantly. He had learned to accommodate himself without complications to the invisible line between press and government.

Government officials also have publicly expressed their

disapproval of extreme sensationalism, but abuses have not resulted in papers being suppressed. The usual official action is to "warn" offending newspapers. For example, the following item in the *Bangkok World* of June 29, 1961:

> Photographers of two Thai language newspapers have been warned to be careful in taking pictures of women from an angle which may result in indecent photos, police spokesman Colonel Luen Boonyachitti said yesterday.
>
> The spokesman said in many instances the women were innocent of the tricky photography which resulted in pictures classed as immoral.

EDUCATION FOR JOURNALISM

Perhaps the best hope, in the long run, for the press and broadcasting stations in Thailand lies in the journalism program at Thammasat University in Bangkok. The journalism unit is the only one in Thailand and one of the few in Asia. It was established in 1954 and has received an unusual amount of expert American help and advice. Despite some difficulties, including a dean who was involved in a *cause celebre* with a woman journalist while on a tour in Germany, the journalism school has become an important part of the University educational program and enjoys the special interest of the nation's two deputy prime ministers, General Thanom Kittikachorn and Prince Wan Waithayakorn. The former serves as rector of Thammasat University and the latter is a former president of the United Nations General Assembly and Thailand's most distinguished statesman. Prince Wan also is president of the Thai Foundation for Journalism Education, founded several years also and supported largely by the Asia Foundation. This organization, with an impressive roster of active members, has had a marked influence, both tangible and intangible, on both the Thammasat journalism program and the Thai press. Its annual awards have come to be known as "Thailand's Pulitzer Prizes" and are highly coveted by journalists. It has become the most important link between the School of Journalism and the working press.

The journalism program has succeeded in attracting an enrollment that embraces quality as well as quantity. Despite the fact that the students generally lack an interrogative kind of mind and the essential journalistic ability to ask searching questions, they are alert and intelligent. Perhaps the most important reason for their inability to probe independently is the system of public and private education which stresses learning by rote and accepting without question what teachers put forth. A Thai observer has written that this trait "reflects itself on the University level where spontaneous discussion of current problems is all but absent, an expressed difference of opinion being held rather impolite."[2] The aspiring journalists, however, demonstrate a willingness to develop inquisitiveness without allowing it to develop into brashness or irresponsibility. One cannot help be impressed by the potential and the desire for learning of many of the students. They form a cadre for the future of which any nation might be proud.

Another encouraging factor is that many of Thailand's outstanding editors, publishers and newsmen have actively aided the program of education for journalism at Thammasat. A surprisingly large number of them also expressed a desire to employ graduates of a soundly developed program. The interest and enthusiasm of leading journalists who attended a meeting called to discuss curriculum matters while I was there was especially encouraging.

IMPROVEMENTS ARE UNDER WAY

Plans are under way to make the journalism unit at Thammasat, now a part of the Faculty of Social Administration, into an administratively independent School of Journalism. In addition, steps have been taken to organize the teaching staff on a full-time basis. The practice of utilizing part-time lecturers, no matter how competent they may be, has proved unsatisfactory.

Journalism graduates in recent years, with notable exceptions, have obtained government positions rather than embark on careers in one of the fields of journalism. As the Thai press, radio and television improve, they will undoubtedly attract more journalism graduates who now are deterred by the belief that only government officials have both security and prestige. The young Thai students have noted with interest that journalists in some countries, especially the United States, can work their way up to positions of considerable influence and high salaries.

Thammasat University, with the expenditure of effort and energy and a relatively small amount of funds, within five years could have an outstanding school of Journalism, one of the best—if not the best—in Asia. All of the necessary ingredients for success are present; the proper mixing of the ingredients, however, is essential. The present dean, Dr. Bancha Minetrakinetra, is an able and dedicated administrator.

Thus education for journalism, as well as the Thai press, faces a comparatively bright future. It is difficult to be sanguine about every aspect of that future, even from 10,000 miles away, when Communist armies continue to press toward the borders of that enchanting land. The Thais, better than most of us, are well aware of the thin line between today and tomorrow, and one cannot leave Thailand without wishing it well.

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[2] *Aspects & Facets of Thailand,* Public Relations Department, 1958, p. 6.

A Bibliography

THE LITERATURE of FOREIGN JOURNALISM

By *WARREN C. PRICE*

WARREN C. PRICE, *the Dean Stone Visiting Professor of Journalism at Montana State University, is eminently qualified to write on this subject. His book,* The Literature of Journalism: An Annotated Bibliography, *won the national awards for research in journalism in 1960 from both Sigma Delta Chi, professional journalistic society, and Kappa Tau Alpha, national journalism honor society. He is on leave spring term from the University of Oregon, where he has been a member of the journalism faculty since 1942.*

Another American reporter's narrative about the Soviet press has recently been published by Random House—*The View from No. 13 People's Street,* by Aline Mosby, a 1943 graduate of the Montana State University School of Journalism. Miss Mosby is the only woman correspondent in Moscow, No. 13 People's Street is the office address of United Press International, and the author's story is simply one of how foreign correspondents work and live and play in the Soviet Union.

This particular book isn't likely to add much substantive weight to the current history of international journalism, for it is filled with light touches relating to personal problems, worn repetitions about there being "no truth in *Pravda*" and "no news in *Izvestia*," and accounts of the nature of Russian newspapers along the line that they contain "just the news that's printed to fit."

The point is, however, that Miss Mosby's view adds another interpretation to the growing literature of journalism relating to foreign countries. Thirty years ago, except for some biographies and war correspondents' memoirs, there was little in the field of international communications and the foreign press to provide an interested reader with extensive factual information about journalism abroad. Today we have several hundred useful volumes on all phases of the subject, and these books are those printed in English and in addition to the autobiographical and personal narrative works. The personal accounts frequently give helpful insights into the workings of the press abroad, and they are almost always interesting, but they are generally not scholarly or based on carefully gathered information written specifically to instruct or explain.

The bulk of the material on international journalism relates to Great Britain and the Commonwealth and to the Western European countries. This circumstance is a natural result of the early start that journalism had in these countries and of the libertarian nature of the Western press—certainly the British press and, except under critical conditions, the French and German press. Language barriers, slow economic development, and authoritarian philosophical concepts have delayed interpretation of journalism in Eastern Europe and in other parts of the world. However, because of activities of British and American journalists and educators, we began getting analyses of Far Eastern journalism as long ago as the 1920s.

Credit for the amassing of knowledge of foreign newspapers, press rights and restrictions, economic handicaps, rates of literacy in countries of the world, and the journalistically-related phases of television and radio must be distributed broadly among many interested journalists

and scholars working independently over a period of nearly 50 years. It is almost unfair to single out individual contributors, but one early student of world journalism was the late Walter Williams, founder of the University of Missouri School of Journalism. As long ago as 1915 Dean Williams prepared a 44-page brochure as one of the early publications of the University of Missouri *Journalism Series,* under the title of *The World's Journalism.* And over a period of 12 years, 1922 to 1934, he edited three volumes relating to proceedings of international press conferences. These were entitled *Press Congress of the World.* They covered sessions held in Honolulu in 1921, Switzerland in 1926, and Mexico in 1931, and included material relating to international censorship, ethical standards of the press, journalistic education abroad, and press organizations. The conferences were not continued, and Dean Williams' books are useful today principally as background for the study of early efforts at international press co-operation.

Another worker for international press organization—although he was concerned wholly with the British Empire—was Robert Donald, a Scottish journalist who became an outstanding leader in Fleet Street in the World War I period. Donald was once proprietor of the London *Globe,* was editor of the *Daily Chronicle* for a time, and in 1909 was one of the founders of the Empire Press Union. At various intervals, beginning in 1909, the work of the Imperial Press Conferences (now called the Commonwealth Press Conferences) has been compiled in a series of volumes issued at approximately five- to seven-year periods. Donald himself in 1921 prepared a 300-page book on the second imperial conference in Canada in 1920; this is a valuable contribution to the journalistic history of the British Empire.

UNESCO PUBLICATIONS

In recent years the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the International Press Institute have published many volumes relating to world communications. UNESCO's reports deal in the main with facts about the press, television and radio, world news agencies, international professional associations of journalists, the films and book publishing as communications media, journalism education around the world, newsprint supplies, and the struggle against illiteracy.

Because of the nature of the United Nations, UNESCO's press studies avoid critical assessments—one way or another—but the many UNESCO books and pamphlets do strive to keep up to date on size and growth with encyclopedia-type information. A good reference to these UNESCO publications can be found in a work published this year by the University of Illinois Press: *Reference Books in the Mass Media,* compiled by Eleanor Blum. Miss Blum lists 19 bibliographical sources to UNESCO alone.

IPI STUDIES

The International Press Institute, a privately supported organization, is more concerned with the international struggle for liberty of the press. Since the IPI was organized 10 years ago (its headquarters are in Zurich), it has issued usually one major publication a year. One of its most significant has been *The Press in Authoritarian Countries,* its fifth general press survey, which is a 201-page study issued in 1959. This is a careful examination of "enslavement" of the press by authoritarian governments since World War II, especially with regard to suppression and censorship and with notes relating to any observable liberalizations. (Miss Mosby, for example, emphasized in her narrative the end of direct Soviet censorship of copy in 1961; but this was after the IPI report.) The IPI's study in 1959 took up the press in the Soviet Union, Chinese People's Republic, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Eastern Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia; and it considered such non-Communist but authoritarian nations as Spain, Portugal, Egypt, Nationalist China, and some Latin American states.

Probably because of the extreme difficulty of synthesizing the subject and keeping it up to date, few general studies of world journalism by individual authors have been made. Those that are in published form are today out of date or are handicapped by their dull textbook style. It is in fact likely that no one book can possibly give an overall view and, if it could, that rapid changes would make the work out of date by the time of issue.

DESMOND'S EARLY BOOK

One distinctly serviceable effort has been made, however. In 1937 Professor Robert W. Desmond of the University of California published *The Press and World Affairs.* The historical base on which this work rests is a sound one, and from it a reader can gain an excellent understanding of how international communications began. Extremely helpful are Desmond's accounts of the rise of Reuters, Havas, the old German Wolff Agency, and the beginnings of world correspondence by the major European newspapers. Of course, post-World War II developments have completely altered the world press picture. Even so, one will understand better why these contemporary changes have come about if he knows their historical foundations.

As to histories of journalism by countries, we are exceedingly well served with studies of the British press, both generally and in accounts of individual English and Empire newspapers. Much is also available on French and German journalism but the bulk of these works is principally in the French and German original. Twelve years

ago Alex Inkeles of Harvard University wrote a splendid book on *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia;* and, as noted above, studies of the Russian press operation in public ownership have been numerous along many fronts.

We also have available short analyses of journalism in many other nations, but these, although useful in their way, are in many cases only brochures.

For intense interest and readability, and frequently for incisive insights, one can gain a wealth of understanding of world journalism and communications—with their interweavings in politics—from the autobiographies, biographies, and war correspondents' memoirs. This chore requires rather wide and steady reading over a long period of time, but in many ways it is the best way of really learning how world journalism ticks.

British journalists, again, have been our most prolific biographical contributors—among them Lords Northcliffe and Beaverbrook, Wickham Steed (once editor of the London *Times*), and a host of reporters. Pierre Lazareff, editor of *France Soir,* tells in *Deadline:The Behind-the-scenes Story of the Last Decade in France* an amazing story of how press corruption helped to bring about the downfall of the Third Republic. And Jean Bekessy, writing under the pseudonym of Hans Habe, tells in *All My Sins* of Nazi pressures on the press in the 1930s and, after the war, of how he became the editor of the first de-Nazified newspaper in Germany.

While the literature of international journalism seldom makes the best-seller lists, much of it is of exceptionally high quality, excellent enough to win national awards for research. One of the journalistic societies granting annual awards for scholarly studies is Kappa Tau Alpha, an organization "dedicated to the recognition and promotion of scholarship in the field of journalism." Among 16 books that have received the Kappa Tau Alpha research award since World War II, at least four have been rather directly related to world problems of the press, while a number of others have had indirect international reference. Studies that have been honored for excellence have included Herbert Brucker's *Freedom of Information* (1949); Inkeles's *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia,* mentioned above (1950); Fredrick S. Siebert's *Freedom of the Press in England,* 1476-1775 (1952); and a joint work by Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm, *Four Theories of the Press* (1955). The last-named work presents historically, descriptively, and critically the authoritarian, libertarian, socially responsible, and Soviet-communist concepts of the functions of the press.

Appended below is a selected list of books on foreign press and communications, in addition to those noted in this article, which should be helpful to those wishing to gain further information. The works have been taken from this author's annotated bibliography, *The Literature of Journalism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1959). They represent only a limited listing.

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Montana Newspaper Hall of Fame

For 40 years, no editorial voice was more influential in directing Montana public opinion than that of Harry B. Brooks. During his decade with the Great Falls Tribune *he was among the most widely quoted Montana editors.*

President Roosevelt in 1937 praised him as an editor "of more than usual ability." Referring to a Brooks editorial entitled "Balancing the Budget of Our National Resources," the President declared that "this editor has written, in simple language that the layman can read and understand, a clear and accurate statement. It is so fine that it speaks my own mind better than I could speak it myself."

"Balancing the Budget of Our National Resources" might also be called the philosophy of Harry Brooks through four decades of editorial leadership in Montana. Certainly no editor was more zealous in promoting the preservation and proper use of Montana's resources.

In the field of Montana reclamation, he is credited with having been one of the principal advocates of construction of the Fresno Dam to store irrigation waters for the Milk River irrigation project. He was the first president of the organization which sought to secure the dam and he gave the dedicatory address when the dam was completed in 1939.

He served as a member of the State Republican Central Committee, 1922-34; secretary of the Montana Crime Commission in 1931, and president of the Montana State Press Association, 1931-1932. He was very active in civic affairs.

Harry Brooks was born Jan. 15, 1877, at Renville, Minn. He studied on his grandfather's farm, was graduated from high school when he was 14 and from the University of Minnesota four years later.

He began his newspaper career at Renville, and during April, 1898, interrupted it to enlist in the Spanish-American War. He was mustered out of service the following December. In 1905 he moved to Chinook, where he worked on the Chinook Bulletin *until purchasing the* Chinook Opinion *about a year later. In 1928 he became editor of the* Havre Daily News *and continued in that capacity until 1934, when he joined the staff of the* Great Falls Tribune *as an editorial writer.*

He died of a heart attack while at work in the Tribune *office in 1944. His wife, Anna, still resides in Great Falls and his son, Jesse, lives in Pasadena, Calif.*

Harry B. Brooks

1877 - 1944

Installed May 6, 1962

The Montana Newspaper Hall of Fame was established Aug. 16, 1958, and is jointly sponsored by the Montana State Press Association and the Montana State University School of Journalism. A committee of six members of the Montana State Press Association and the dean of the School of Journalism recommend to the Association one person for inclusion in the Hall of Fame each year. Five years must elapse from the time of death before a candidate may be nominated.



Journalism Building, Montana State University
Missoula, Montana

Education for Journalism at Montana State University

The School of Journalism at Montana State University is one of the pioneers in journalism education. It was founded in 1914, only six years after the establishment of the first school of journalism in the United States, and is one of the 48 schools and departments of journalism accredited by the American Council on Education for Journalism. The School also was a charter member of the Association of Accredited School and Departments of Journalism.

A broad cultural education is the foundation of the curriculum offered by the School of Journalism. Approximately three-fourths of the credits offered for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in Journalism are taken in the humanities and social sciences. Journalism courses, dedicated to the highest professional standards, stress history, ethics, social responsibility and current problems as well as the technical skills necessary for success in the various fields of journalism.

School of Journalism
Montana State University
Missoula, Montana